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The Emergence of the Environmental Impact 
Assessment Duty as a Global Legal Norm and 
General Principle of Law 
BY TSEMING YANG† 
More than half a century ago, Rudolf Schlesinger announced a global survey of legal principles 
in the pages of the American Journal of International Law. The project’s objective was the 
identification of a “common core” of legal norms among the family of nations and the ultimate 
goal the production of something akin to a global restatement of law. Such an endeavor was to 
yield global principles of law, ultimately giving substance to the General Principles of Law 
provision under Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. In spite of the 
initial enthusiasm surrounding the project, its ultimate goal was never realized. 
Five decades later, the prospect of engaging in such a project, focused on the environmental law 
field, promises more fruitful outcomes. In this Article, I argue that globalization and other trends 
have made the EIA duty—the duty to perform environmental impact assessments for projects 
that are likely to have a significant impact on the environment—a globally accepted norm. A 
survey of 197 jurisdictions finds that the duty has been nearly universally adopted. The Article 
suggests that the EIA duty may now be seen as a “general principle of law recognized by 
civilized nations,” and in that sense has joined the body of public international law. Finally, the 
survey results also point to comparative law methodology as a promising opportunity for 
identifying new legal norms in the international environmental law field, independent of the 
cumbersome process of treaty negotiation or the time-consuming development of customary law.  
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and suggestions. Additional research was provided by Min Jeong Koh, Susan Shapiro, and Cynthia Yuan. The 
research was supported by funding from Santa Clara Law School and Santa Clara University’s Sustainability 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the years, a perception has arisen that the earliest of the modern 
environmental law norms—the duty to conduct an environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) before engaging in projects that are likely to have a significant 
impact on the environment—has become globally accepted. Until recently, that 
perception was unsubstantiated or based on studies that indicated substantially 
70.2-YANG (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2019  12:36 PM 
February 2019]         ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT DUTY 527 
less than universal acceptance. The 197-jurisdiction survey1 of worldwide EIA 
legislation described in this Article now provides empirical support for the 
proposition that the duty to conduct an EIA is no longer a hortatory admonition 
of good practice or authorization for discretionary application, but has in fact 
become a globally accepted legal norm. Specifically, at least 183 jurisdictions 
have now adopted the EIA duty as part of their environmental governance 
system, about ninety-three percent.2 
The survey has three main implications. First, widespread consensus 
among jurisdictions about this norm empirically confirms that the EIA process 
is a broadly accepted tool for managing the environment. Second, the 
widespread consensus also confirms what Professor Robert Percival and I have 
previously suggested about the emergence of global environmental legal norms 
and that the EIA duty is one such global norm. Finally, the survey demonstrates 
that through its ubiquitous adoption, it has become a “general principle of law,” 
as it is a norm that satisfies the requirements of the General Principles provision 
of the three primary sources of public international law.3 In other words, the EIA 
duty has emerged as a binding legal norm that is part of public international law.  
If the broader international law community is persuaded that the EIA norm 
is a general principle of international law, it will shed light on a largely 
overlooked approach to identifying international environmental law—
comparative law analysis.4 While this research approach to identifying public 
international law norms enjoyed popularity in the 1950s and 60s, it lost visibility 
because of practical research challenges. 
Norms embodied in general principles of international law are distinct and 
independent in their origin from those created by treaty and customary law. Yet, 
they also are an integral part of public international law. These legal principles 
are relied on in the operations of international organizations and play important 
gap-filling functions in the adjudicative work of the International Court of 
Justice, dispute settlement processes ranging from the World Trade 
Organization to UNCLOS, international human rights bodies, and other arbitral 
 
 1. The survey included the 193 member states of the United Nations, the European Union, the Holy See, 
Palestine, and Taiwan.  
 2. The number includes the European Union and counts it as a jurisdiction separate from its member 
states. 
 3. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 1055, 
33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute] (listing the three primary sources of public international law—
international conventions, international customs, and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(c) (AM. LAW. INST. 1987); see 
also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 21, ¶ 1(c), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (“The 
Court shall apply: . . . [as a supplement] general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of 
legal systems of the world.”). For elaboration on this assertion, see infra Subpart III.C.  
 4. Comparative law approaches to studying environmental law generally have grown in recent times, 
especially evidenced by the creation of law journals such as the Review of European Community and 
International Environmental Law. See Elisa Morgera, Global Environmental Law and Comparative Legal 
Methods, 24 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 254 (2015) (discussing the relevance of comparative 
law methodology to studying the growth of environmental law across the world).  
70.2-YANG (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2019  12:36 PM 
528 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:525 
tribunals. They are also part of the body of public international law applied by 
U.S. domestic courts. Thus, the potential practical implications of the survey are 
significant.  
Part I of this Article explains the value of the EIA norm and the prevailing 
consensus among environmental professionals that EIA requirements represent 
sound public policy and are foundational to effective environmental planning 
and governance. Part II shares the survey results indicating that the EIA duty has 
spread across the world and become a globally accepted legal norm. Part III 
explains General Principles of Law as a source of public international law and 
explores the promise they could hold for the development of international 
environmental law. Based on the survey’s finding that the EIA norm is 
ubiquitous and globally adopted, I argue that it should be considered a general 
principle of international law. Part IV explores the practical implications of 
recognizing the EIA norm as a general principle of law. 
There are two issues worth noting at the outset. The first is one of 
terminology. The term “NEPA Process” is used to refer to the specific 
requirements and environmental assessment process of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1969. 
NEPA is the original model for environmental impact assessment procedures 
across the world. In contrast, references in the Article to “EIA” or EIA process 
are intended to refer to impact assessment processes generally and are not 
specific to NEPA or the processes of any particular legal system.  
The second is my decision to utilize the ICJ Statute’s formulation of 
General Principles (“general principles of law recognized by civilized nations”) 
as the primary frame of reference for this Article. The Restatement (Third) of 
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States provides an alternative 
formulation, as “general principles common to the major legal systems of the 
world.” While the phrasing is different, the content of the ICJ formulation is 
substantively similar to (or at a minimum encompasses) that of the Restatement.5 
I have chosen the ICJ formulation for the discussion here, in part because it 
appears to have been more widely used in the literature and judicial opinions.  
Finally, I note that this Article does not attempt to define or delineate with 
specificity the scope of the principle or address its normative reach in 







 5. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 reporter’s note 7 
(AM. LAW. INST. 1987) (“It has become clear that [the ICJ’s formulation of General Principles] refers to general 
principles of law common to the major legal systems of the world.”). The different phrasing is also addressed 
infra Subparts III.C.2, III.C.III, and note 177. 
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I.  THE EIA NORM AS A GOOD PRACTICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING AND 
GOVERNANCE 
A. WHAT IS IT?  
In its essence, EIA is an obligation to stop and consider environmental 
consequences before acting, a process that requires investigation and evaluation 
of the environmental impact of a proposed project or action before it goes 
forward. The International Association for Impact Assessment has defined it as 
“the process of identifying, predicting, evaluating and mitigating the 
biophysical, social, and other relevant effects of development proposals prior to 
major decisions being taken and commitments made.”6 Thus, government 
agencies are usually required to produce a “publicly reviewable physical 
document reflecting the required internal project analysis,” ensuring “that the 
agency has given ‘good faith consideration’ to the environmental consequences 
of its proposed action and its reasonable alternatives.”7 Almost always, the EIA 
process includes the public in the gathering of information as well as in the 
review of the document. 
While conceptually simple, the EIA norm is thus an umbrella principle that 
embodies a number of more specific duties. These subsidiary norms include the 
requirement to generate particular types of impact information, actual 
consideration of such information by the decision-maker, governmental 
transparency and accountability, and engagement of the public. Jurisdictions 
vary in their choices of articulating these subsidiary norms in legislation or 
regulation.8 
In concrete terms, the EIA norm is operationalized as follows: When a 
project proposal triggers the EIA duty, a government agency will engage in a 
“screening” step that identifies potentially significant impacts of the project. If 
it is determined that the project does not have any significant impacts, usually 
an abbreviated assessment document is generated (an “Environmental 
Assessment” under NEPA) and the process comes to an early end. Alternatively, 
if any impacts will or could be significant, a full-blown impact assessment is 
initiated. A “scoping” process then determines what impacts, including 
cumulative and indirect effects, as well as project alternatives are to be included 
in the impact analysis. Once the relevant information has been collected and 
 
 6. INT'L ASS’N FOR IMPACT ASSESSMENT, WHAT IS IMPACT ASSESSMENT? 1 (2009), 
http://www.iaia.org/uploads/pdf/What_is_IA_web.pdf (internal quotation marks omitted); see also JOHN 
GLASSON ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT 3–4 (4th ed. 2012); CHRISTOPHER 
WOOD, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW 1 (2d ed. 2003). 
 7. ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 320 
(4th ed. 2010). 
 8. For example, NEPA’s EIA language is relatively sparse and left most of the details of EIA 
implementation (including such subsidiary norms) to agency regulations. Id. at 319. In contrast, for example, 
Australia’s Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act of 1999 provides much more details with 
respect to the EIA mechanism. See Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) ss 
80–105 (Austl.). 
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analyzed, a written impact assessment document (“Environmental Impact 
Statement” under NEPA) is prepared for review by the agency decision-maker. 
The public is usually involved in the assessment process during the information 
collection stage and in review of the draft document. Based on the impact 
assessment document, the decision-maker then decides whether to go forward 
with the proposed project or to choose an alternative action.  
EIA was first pioneered in the United States with the enactment of the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).9 Even in its early days, 
NEPA was both celebrated and maligned. Some described it as fundamentally 
altering environmental planning and regulation, while others accused it of doing 
little to stem the tide of environmental destruction brought on by the modern 
world.10 In spite of its flaws,11 environmentalists, planners, and regulators have 
universally come to accept it as a critical and fundamental component of modern 
environmental regulatory systems.12 Equally important, EIA has also 
contributed to establishing the crucial role of the public and its legitimate 
concerns in environmental regulation.13  
NEPA’s impact assessment requirement might be described as the product 
of legislative fortuity and as an “afterthought,” arising from senate hearing 
testimony of Professor Lynton Caldwell of Indiana University.14 As 
commentators have pointed out, “whether Congress understood what it 
legislated, and [whether it] expected that the environmental impact statement 
would become a major instrument of environmental review, is far from clear.”15 
Prior versions of the pending House and Senate bill had focused primarily on 
the creation of the Council on Environmental Quality while Caldwell’s 
testimony called for an environmental “findings” requirement imposed on 
federal agencies.16 The eventual language became the “detailed statement” 
requirement, the environmental impact statement that all federal agencies are 
 
 9. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2012). 
 10. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239 (1973). 
 11. See infra Subpart I.C.  
 12. See, e.g., INT’L UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE, WORLD COMM’N ON ENVTL. LAW, DRAFT 
PROJECT: GLOBAL PACT FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, art. 5, at 3 (2017) 
https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/content/documents/draft-project-of-the-global-pact-for-the-
environment.pdf; U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. 1), annex 1, princ. 17 (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development]. 
 13. In the United States, many states have incorporated EIA processes into their own environmental 
regulatory schemes, such as the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). Some executive branch actions 
that are not subject to NEPA have also been made subject to the requirements of EIA by virtue of President 
Carter’s Executive Order 12114, requiring EIA processes for some US activities abroad and in the global 
commons. Exec. Order No. 12,114 , 44 Fed. Reg. 1957 (Jan. 4, 1979). 
 14. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969: Hearings on S. 1075, S. 237 & S. 1752 Before the S. 
Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 91st Cong. 116 (1969); see also DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., NEPA 
LAW AND LITIGATION, 2D, § 2.2 (2018). 
 15. MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 14, § 2.4.  
 16. Id. § 2.2. 
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subject to for proposals of major federal action.17 In the aftermath, this detailed 
statement language has become a source of significant case law as well as the 
CEQ regulations setting out the specific requirements for agency compliance 
with NEPA. 
The passage of time has shown that NEPA, and EIA processes more 
generally, have affected government processes in two important aspects. First, 
it has forced government agencies to “stop and think before making decisions 
and taking actions that harm the environment.”18 Thus, Professor Houck noted 
that the redeeming virtue of NEPA is the process leading up to NEPA’s 
Environmental Impact Statement:  
It is not what the statement says that is important. It is in what comes before, in 
what agencies have to investigate and learn and listen to, in what they have to 
fear from other agencies and from environmental groups, the press, and 
reviewing courts, and in the every day responses and accommodations that they 
have to make.19 
Second, many scholars have pointed out that one of NEPA’s most 
important positive effects may thus be immeasurable and likely unknowable: the 
“anonymous thousands of destructive . . . projects that [were] withdrawn, or 
never proposed in the first place, in anticipation of” NEPA scrutiny.”20 
Thus, under NEPA, significant amounts of information have been 
generated and publicly disclosed either to be used by the government itself or by 
civil society and the media to exert pressure on agencies, initiate litigation, or 
otherwise effect political accountability. In the United States, the process has 
given environmental advocates special “strategic leverage: Citizens can sue in 
court to invalidate the EIS [if the agency has failed to adequately disclose the 
negative impacts of the proposed project or actions], halting agency actions 
pending full procedural compliance with NEPA.”21 In short, the EIA process’s 
public disclosure requirements have leveraged the maxim that “information is 
power.”22 
 
 17. NEPA section 102(C) calls for the inclusion 
in every . . . proposal[] for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the 
quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on the 
environmental impact of the proposed action, any adverse environmental effects which cannot be 
avoided should the proposal be implemented, alternatives to the proposed action, the relationship 
between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-
term productivity, and any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be 
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.  
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012). 
 18. PLATER ET AL., supra note 7, at 319. 
 19. Oliver A. Houck, Is That All? A Review of The National Environmental Policy Act, An Agenda for the 
Future, by Lynton Keith Caldwell, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 173, 190–91 (2000) (book review). 
 20. PLATER ET AL., supra note 7, at 320. In the end, however, it must be remembered that EIA processes 
were never intended to be the sole tool for protecting the environment, but one part, albeit a significant one, of 
a larger environmental governance system.  
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 319. 
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Over the years, NEPA case law has resolved questions such as whether the 
failure to prepare an EIA can be used to stop a project (yes), in what 
circumstances an EIA is required and what kind (an environmental assessment 
or environmental impact statement), the issues and impacts that must be included 
in an EIA, and whether the most environmentally sound alternative must be 
chosen at the end (it does not).23 
Over the four and a half decades since NEPA’s enactment, the EIA 
requirement has spread across the world, becoming embedded both in public 
international law24 as well as in the national laws of almost all countries. It 
appears as principle 17 in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, as Article 206 in the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, and as Article 14 of the Convention on Biological Diversity.25 Its 
requirements have been incorporated into the Operational Policies and 
Procedures of the World Bank and other multilateral development banks,26 
which apply to all of the projects that these institutions support financially 
throughout the world. It has also spread throughout the world’s national 
environmental law systems, enacted in the laws of France in 1977,27 in China in 
1979,28 in Brazil in 1981,29 made applicable by directive to the countries of the 
European Union in 1985,30 in India in 1986,31 in Mexico in 1988,32 and in the 
Russian Federation in 1995.33 In 1991, EIA became the focus of the Espoo 
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary 
 
 23. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 14, §§ 4:54–4:62, 10:43, 12:22. 
 24. See generally NEIL CRAIK, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT: 
PROCESS, SUBSTANCE AND INTEGRATION (2008) (discussing the international spread and adoption of EIA in 
international treaties and organizations); Alexander Gillespie, Environmental Impact Assessments in 
International Law, 17 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 221, 222 (2008). 
 25. For a listing of international instruments containing EIA commitments, see CRAIK, supra note 24, at 
283 app. 1. 
 26. WORLD BANK, OPERATIONAL MANUAL: OP 4.01—ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT (2013), 
https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/090224b0822f7384.pdf [hereinafter OP 4.01]; WORLD 
BANK, OPERATIONAL MANUAL: BP 4.01—ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, 
https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/090224b0822fe860.pdf [hereinafter BP 4.01]. 
 27. Décret 77-1141 du 12 octobre 1977 pris pour l’application de l’article 2 de la loi 76-629 du 10 juillet 
1976 relative à la protection de la nature [General Implementation Decree No. 77–1141, 1977], JOURNAL 
OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Oct. 13, 1977, p. 4948 (Fr.). 
 28. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa (Shixing) (中华人民共和国环境保护法[试行]) 
[Environmental Protection Law of the People's Republic of China (Trial)] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People's Cong., Sept. 13, 1979), art. 13 (China).  
 29. Lei No. 6.938, de 31 de Agosto de 1981, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] (Braz.); Resoluçāo 
Conama No. 1, de 23 de Janeiro de 1986, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIĀO [D.O.U.] de 11.02.1986 (Braz.). 
 30. Directive 85/337/EEC, of the European Parliament and Council of 27 June 1985 on the Assessment of 
the Effects of Certain Public and Private Projects on the Environment,1985 O.J. (L175) 40. 
 31. The Environment (Protection) Act, No. 29 of 1986, INDIA CODE (1986). 
 32. Ley General del Equilibrio Ecológico y la Protección al Ambiente [General Law of Ecological 
Equilibrium and Environmental Protection], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 28-1-1988, última reforma 
DOF 5-6-2018 (Mex.). 
 33. Federal'nyi Zakon Rossiyskoy Federatsii ob Ekologicheskoy Ekspertize [Federal Law of the Russian 
Federation on Ecological Expertise], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] Nov. 23, 1995 (amended Apr. 15, 1998). 
70.2-YANG (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2019  12:36 PM 
February 2019]         ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT DUTY 533 
Context.34 In 2010, the International Court of Justice declared in the Pulp Mills 
on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) case that EIA in the transboundary 
context had become a binding norm of international law.35 
Along with its adoption in international treaties, in the operational 
processes of international organizations, and in national and sub-national laws 
across the world, EIA has become the primary focus of entire professional 
associations, such as the International Association of Impact Assessment, the 
National Association of Environmental Professionals, and the California 
Association of Environmental Professionals. Each of these professional 
associations has a membership numbering in the thousands.36 
B. EIA NORM AS GOOD PUBLIC POLICY AND PRACTICE 
The EIA process has enjoyed great popularity among environmental 
regulators and professionals, in part because it was the first of the modern 
environmental regulatory tools. Specifically, it has enhanced environmental 
decision-making processes in four aspects: (1) rationality, (2) sensitivity to 
environmental concerns, (3) transparency, and (4) accountability of 
environmental decision-making processes.  
EIA processes ensure the availability of key environmental information by 
requiring that such information be collected and brought to the attention of the 
decision-maker. In doing so, EIAs explicitly insert environmental values and 
concerns into the decision process and flag them as important EIA processes, 
thereby enhancing transparency since the gathered information must be 
disclosed to the public. In turn, the public can be more engaged and participate 
more effectively in the decision process. Finally, transparency promotes 
accountability for decisions affecting the public welfare generally and with 
respect to the environment specifically.  
 
 34. U.N. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Feb. 25, 1991, 
30 I.L.M. 800 (1991).  
 35. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 204 (Apr. 20); see 
also Alan Boyle, Developments in the International Law of Environmental Impact Assessments and Their 
Relation to the Espoo Convention, 20 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 227, 227 (2011) (“This finding 
treats transboundary EIA as a distinct and freestanding obligation in international law . . . .”). The International 
Law Association’s 2004 Berlin Rules on Water Resources also took the position in article 29 that the EIA must 
be performed when there may be a “significant effect on the aquatic environment or the sustainable development 
of waters.” INT’L LAW ASS’N WATER RES. COMM., BERLIN CONFERENCE ON WATER RESOURCES LAW, FOURTH 
REPORT 31 (2004), https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/water/meetings/ 
legal_board/2010/annexes_groundwater_paper/Annex_IV_Berlin_Rules_on_Water_Resources_ILA.pdf. 
However, in its commentary it also acknowledged that while the EIA duty "has crystallized into a rule of 
customary international law, at least insofar as transboundary effects are concerned, . . . relatively little direct 
support for [a broader obligation] in international legal authorities.” Id. at 31–32. 
 36. The IAIA has over 1700 members from 120 nations. About IAIA, INT’L ASS’N IMPACT ASSESSMENT, 
http://www.iaia.org/about.php (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). The NAEP has about 1000 members. About: NAEP 
Affiliation, CAL. ASS’N ENVTL. PROF’LS, http://califaep.org/about-aep/naep (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). The 
CalAEP has over 1700 members. About, CAL. ASS’N ENVTL. PROF’LS, http://califaep.org/about-aep (last visited 
Jan. 19, 2019). 
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In countries where environmental law and regulatory systems are only of 
recent vintage and are still in the process of embedding themselves in the 
government and civil society, the EIA norm has usually been among the first 
environmental laws to be enacted and become generally accepted as a “good 
practice.”37 Regular application of EIA processes has helped regulators and 
other public officials internalize concern for environmental quality and support 
the growth of civil society. The result has not only been to promote 
environmental objectives, such as environmental sustainability, but also to 
strengthen the rule of law, democratic governance, and ultimately human rights, 
especially as related to the environment.38  
Even in countries where the rule of law is not robust and civil society is 
still weak, EIA processes can make a difference. EIA processes tend to increase 
the transparency of environmental governance to the international community, 
enabling international organizations, development agencies, and international 
environmental NGOs to use their influence and resources more effectively to 
improve environmental outcomes. Their leverage can include delayed 
disbursement or cancellation of aid money, diplomatic pressure by influential 
governments, and swaying the sympathy and market power of foreign 
consumers.39 In other words, even when transparency has not made national 
governments more accountable to their own people, there is no question that it 
can enhance accountability to the international community. Finally, 
transparency and the process of public engagement envisioned by the EIA 
process can ultimately serve as a civil society organizing mechanism, with 
environmental concern serving as a nucleus around which communities and the 
public can engage more deeply with governance and policy.  
 
 37. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE REVIEWS: 
CHILE 2016, at 107 (2016) (“Environmental impact assessment (EIA), [was] introduced by the 1994 
Environmental Basic Law, [and] is the oldest, most important and most developed instrument of environmental 
regulation in Chile.”); ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 
REVIEWS: BRAZIL 2015, at 116 (2015) (“For a long time, EIA was the only environmental management tool 
applied in the country on a large scale.”); see also WORLD BANK, SUSTAINABLE DEV. DEP’T, LATIN AM. & THE 
CARIBBEAN REGION, REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR COUNTRY ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS: ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY AND NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT FOR SUSTAINED ECONOMIC GROWTH AND POVERTY 
ALLOCATION 17–18 (2007) (“Licensing, through environmental impact assessments, has become the main (and 
sometimes only) management tool to minimize or mitigate environmental impacts to third parties, due to the 
absence of regulations for pollution control, zoning, and water resources management.”). 
 38. See, e.g., JOSEPH FOTI ET AL., WORLD RES. INST., VOICE AND CHOICE: OPENING THE DOOR TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL DEMOCRACY 10–13 (Greg Mock & Bob Livernash eds., 2008), 
http://pdf.wri.org/voice_and_choice.pdf. In fact, to the extent that good environmental governance, democracy, 
and the rule of law are mutually interdependent, strengthening one will also support the others. 
 39. While the use of such leverage does not seem to occur systematically, there have been some high-
profile instances of such international responses. For example, as international opposition by environmentalists 
and human rights activists to the construction of the Three Gorges Dam in China grew due to the environmental 
and human rights impacts, the US Export-Import Bank, the World Bank, and other international financial 
institutions withdrew their support of the project. See, e.g., Kate Kearins & Greg O’Malley, International 
Financial Institutions and the Three Gorges Hydroelectric Power Scheme, GREENER MGMT. INT'L, Autumn 
1999, at 85, 85. 
70.2-YANG (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2019  12:36 PM 
February 2019]         ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT DUTY 535 
C. CRITICISMS OF THE EIA NORM 
Describing the EIA process as “good practice” implicitly acknowledges 
that it is not perfect. In fact, those who see the EIA norm as not doing enough to 
protect the environment have not spared their serious misgivings. For example, 
Professor Joseph Sax, who eventually became a supporter of NEPA, wrote in 
the early days that for improving the administrative process through disclosure 
requirements, EIA could not be “a more dubious example of wishful thinking,” 
with little prospect of “significant self-reform by agencies.”40 Instead, he said, 
NEPA would “produce little except fodder for law review writers and contracts 
for that newest of growth industries, environmental consulting.”41 He was 
certainly correct with respect to the emergence of an entire environmental 
consulting industry associated with the EIA duty.  
Even as EIA has spread across the globe, criticism has not gone away. 
Developers usually argue that environmentalists use the EIA process as a 
delaying tactic and to increase project costs. Internationally, EIA requirements 
have been maligned as “anti-development, expensive,” and, in the development 
assistance context, potentially infringing on an aid “recipient’s sovereignty or 
complicat[ing] the administration of aid.”42 Nevertheless, multilateral 
development banks such as the World Bank have imposed their own EIA 
requirements for bank-financed projects as a condition of financial support, 
independent of the borrower country’s own EIA requirements.43 Environmental 
critiques have usually focused on effectiveness issues, especially the argument 
that the EIA process by itself is not enough to protect the environment.  
There are at least five broad categories into which the criticisms fall: (1) its 
procedural focus, (2) ease of subversion of the EIA’s purpose, (3) 
implementation issues associated with the technical aspects of EIA, (4) 
accessibility to the public, and (5) dependence on the rule of law for 
effectiveness.44  
 
 40. Sax, supra note 10, at 239, 245. 
 41. Id. Justice Marshall said, in a dissent, “this vaguely worded statute seems designed to serve as no more 
than a catalyst for development of a ‘common law’ of NEPA.” Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 421 (1976) 
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 42. Nicholas A. Robinson, International Trends in Environmental Impact Assessment, 19 BELLAGIO CONF. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 591, 595 (1992). Of course anything that slows down or imposes additional impediments, 
however necessary to the broader public good, could be criticized on those same grounds. 
 43. See, e.g., INT’L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., WORLD BANK, ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL 
FRAMEWORK 16, 17 (2017), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/383011492423734099/pdf/114278-
WP-REVISED-PUBLIC-Environmental-and-Social-Framework.pdf (“ESS1 [Environment and Social Standard 
1] applies to all projects supported by the Bank through Investment Project Financing. . . . The Borrower will 
assess, manage and monitor the environmental and social risks and impacts of the project throughout the project 
life cycle so as to meet the requirements of the ESSs in a manner and within a timeframe acceptable to the Bank.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 44. In an alternative formulation, Barry Sadler has described the weaknesses of existing EIA processes in 
terms of five major problem areas related to the (1) attitudes of project proponents and government agencies, (2) 
structural integration of EIA with decision-making processes, (3) institutional issues, (4) procedural 
inadequacies in the implementation of EIA, and (5) technical issues. Barry Sadler, Ex-Post Evaluation of the 
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First, critics of NEPA often point out that “NEPA’s lack of substantive 
requirements makes the act little more than a procedural hoop through which 
federal agencies must jump.”45 In fact, “many scholars have criticized domestic 
EIA [in many nations] for lacking a connection to a general prohibition on 
environmental law,” that is, the EIA process often does not stop projects that are 
environmentally destructive.46 They argue that EIA is pointless without it.47 In 
fact, even in the U.S. system, “[n]othing in [NEPA] itself prohibits actions with 
adverse environmental impacts as long as they have been identified and 
considered when making the decision.”48  
NEPA’s lack of a substantive requirement also forms the basis of the 
second set of criticisms: insufficient integration with the substantive decision-
making process allows the EIA’s process objective to be too readily subverted.49 
In such accounts, government agencies tend to engage in “defensive” 
preparation of environmental impact statements to avoid litigation because of 
their perception that NEPA requirements are used as a harassment tool. Rather 
than engaging in a “real” look at the environmental impacts, government 
agencies narrowly focus on meeting the technical legal requirements and just go 
through the motions in their preparation of EIS documents.50 The result is to 
divert agencies from utilizing a broad perspective on their environmental 
responsibilities to their decision-making processes.51 Oliver Houck went as far 
as to describe existing NEPA processes as “an elaborate catechism requiring 
years of delay and paperwork—often irrelevant, always self-promoting, and at 
times outright deceitful in its consideration of environmental effects—before 
getting on with the job.”52 
The third area of concern has focused on the practical implementation of 
the technical aspects of EIAs. Oftentimes, “the scope of [impact assessments] is 
too narrowly defined or applied, such that social, health factors, and cumulative 
effects are inadequately covered.”53 Barry Sadler has also noted the 
requirements are too technical such that the “quality of EISs, the accuracy of 
 
Effectiveness of Environmental Assessment, in ENVIRONMENTAL METHODS REVIEW: RETOOLING IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT FOR THE NEW CENTURY 30, 31 (Alan L. Porter & John J. Fittipaldi eds., 1998). 
 45. Mark W. Anderson, National Environmental Policy Act, in BERKSHIRE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
SUSTAINABILITY: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF SUSTAINABILITY 393, 393 (2010). 
 46. John H. Knox, The Myth and Reality of Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment, 96 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 291, 316–17 (2002). 
 47. Id. at 317.  
 48. Anderson, supra note 45, at 394. 
 49. Sadler, supra note 44, at 31. 
 50. See Eugene Bardach & Lucian Pugliaresi, The Environmental-Impact Statement vs. the Real World, 49 
PUB. INT. 22, 24 (1977) (“Agencies cannot be penetrating or creative when their analyses are directed and 
mobilized for primary defensive purposes.”). 
 51. MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 14, § 11.2. 
 52. Houck, supra note 19, at 176. Moreover, “a sad lesson of the NEPA experience is that, given the 
resistance of federal development agencies and the limited supervisory power of CEQ, what citizen groups 
cannot enforce will die on the vine.” Oliver A. Houck, Worst Case and the Deepwater Horizon Blowout: There 
Ought to Be a Law, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 11033, 11038 (2010). 
 53. Sadler, supra note 44, at 31. 
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impact predictions, and the suitability of mitigation measures are often highly 
variable, even in relatively mature, advanced EA systems.”54  
The technical complexities of the reports produced is directly related to the 
fourth area of criticism, EIA reports that are inaccessible to the public even 
though public participation and public comment are an integral part of the 
process. In that regard, Professor Sax noted, “[w]e have accepted the principle 
of public participation, but we have no established mechanisms to assure that 
members of the public have the professional resources to operate as 
knowledgeable and informed participants.”55  
A final concern, dependence on a strong rule of law for its effectiveness, 
has been less explored. In order for the EIA process to fulfill its role in promoting 
transparency and accountability, mechanisms must be in place to correct failure 
of the process. In other words, a strong legal and regulatory system is a pre-
requisite for EIA effectiveness; access to justice, including mechanisms 
ensuring effective legal processes and courts, must be available to pressure 
government officials. Yet, such tools and institutions are often weak or non-
existent in nations that do not have a robust rule of law and legal institutions, 
especially in many developing countries.  
Undoubtedly, much of the criticism has serious merit, and EIA processes 
are far from perfect. By themselves, EIA mechanisms are insufficient to 
constitute a comprehensive environmental protection system.56 Yet, the overall 
conclusion—that EIA processes are weak, inadequate, and should be made 
stronger—does not negate the reality that they do provide decision-makers with 
valuable information, insert environmental values into governance, and have had 
substantively improved environmental outcomes. Moreover, even if the 
technical complexity of EIAs has meant significant variability in their quality 
and made them difficult to understand by ordinary citizens, it is also 
undisputable that EIA documents have been useful to officials and that 
environmental advocates, especially in the United States, have made effective 
use of them to challenge government actions. And with respect to most 
developing countries, such criticisms fail to acknowledge that the alternative to 
existing EIA processes is not a better process or more effective regulatory 
mechanism, but no EIA requirement at all. In many such systems, regulatory 
systems and the rule of law are weak. If in such systems the alternative is to have 
no EIA requirements nor other effective regulatory framework, the value of 




 54. Id. 
 55. Sax, supra note 10, at 246. 
 56. WORLD BANK, SUSTAINABLE DEV. DEP’T, supra note 37, at 17–18. 
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II.  EIA DUTY AS A GLOBAL NORM OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
A. THE PERCEPTION OF GLOBAL ACCEPTANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT  
The appeal of NEPA and the EIA norm to environmental rationality, by 
requiring investigation and careful consideration of adverse environmental 
impacts before government action, led to its widespread international acceptance 
as a prudent measure of environmental management and planning. The norm 
became embedded so quickly in contemporary views of good environmental 
governance that many readily assumed EIA requirements to have been 
universally adopted across the world.  
My own personal recollections of this perception came about through 
experiences in various informal discussions, as early as the mid-1990s, not much 
more than twenty-five years after NEPA’s enactment. At that time, EIA 
processes had been adopted in highly visible international instruments and 
legislation. The European Economic Community issued Directive 85/335 in 
1985, requiring all member states to impose EIA duties within their 
environmental regulatory systems.57 Principle 17 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development called on nations to utilize EIA “as a national 
instrument . . . for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse 
impact on the environment.”58 EIA processes had already been incorporated into 
the operations of multilateral development banks.59 The EIA duty was even 
raised in international arbitral fora, including in the International Court of 
Justice.60 These developments made the belief of global acceptance plausible.  
 
 57. Directive 85/337/EEC, supra note 30, art. 2, at 41. 
 58. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 12, princ. 17. EIA processes are also 
called for within regional environmental agreements, such as the North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation arts. 2(1)(e), 10(7), Sept. 14, 1993, 107 Stat. 2164, 32 I.L.M. 1480, and global multilateral 
environmental treaties such as the U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity art. 14, opened for signature June 
4, 1993, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79, though generally not legally required. It did become the focus of one European 
regional agreement, making EIA mandatory for transboundary impacts, the U.N. ECE’s Espoo Convention. U.N. 
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, supra note 34. After the Espoo 
Convention entered into force in 1997, the parties amended the Convention to allow for membership by any 
U.N. member state. U.N. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, annex 
XIV, Decision II/14, Amendment to the Espoo Convention (Feb. 27, 2001). 
 59. Within the World Bank, the EIA duty has become an integral part of its operations, including its lending 
practices, and is included with just a handful of other requirements that can give rise to a claim with the Bank’s 
Inspection Panel process. OP 4.01, supra note 26. 
 60. For example, New Zealand insisted that preparation of an EIA was a corollary requirement of the 
precautionary principle and a precondition for the nuclear test activities by France in the Nuclear Tests case. 
Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. Rep. 288, 290 (Sept. 22). In 2010, the International Court of 
Justice announced in the Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay case that the duty to conduct an EIA in a transboundary 
context was now a “requirement under general international law . . . where there is a risk that the proposed 
industrial activity may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in particular, on a shared 
resource.” Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 83 (Apr. 20). 
Because of the reference in the opinion to “a practice, [that] in recent years has gained so much acceptance 
among States,” the statement has generally been interpreted as finding a norm of customary international law. 
Id. 
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However, as early as 1992, a mere two decades after NEPA’s enactment, 
Professor Nicholas Robinson surveyed environmental impact assessment 
legislation across the world and found only thirty-nine nations with EIA 
requirements, in addition to a number of treaties and organizations with EIA 
provisions.61 Subsequent surveys found a growing number of nations adopting 
an EIA duty, including a report by UNEP in the 1990s,62 a 1996 study by the 
International Association for Impact Assessment,63 and a 1998 study by the 
International Institute for Environment and Development of then-existing EIA 
regulations and guidelines.64 Until now, the 1998 EIA Directory was the most 
up-to-date published study available and counted 108 nations with legislation 
imposing an EIA duty.65 
In many respects, the rapid spread of EIA duties should not be surprising 
given globalization and other trends. Professor Robert Percival and I have 
previously argued that such trends signify the emergence of what we referred to 
as “global environmental law”—environmental law norms that are universally 
recognized and accepted across jurisdictions.66 They appear not only in national 
and local environmental law and governance systems but also in regional and 
global systems, including multilateral environmental agreements and 
international organizations. That is not to say that the manifestation and 
implementation of such norms does not vary in accordance with legal context 
and history. However, the substantive applicability of such norms and their 
recognition as legally obligatory does not depend on the particular legal tradition 
or cultural context.  
The trends that we have identified as contributing to the emergence of 
global environmental law include transplantation, convergence, and 
integration/harmonization efforts. As we previously described, EIA norms have 
been a prime subject of environmental law “transplantation,” that is, the effort 
of “deliberate copying and adaptation of significant portions of statutes or 
 
 61. Robinson, supra note 42, apps. 1–2 (listing environmental impact assessment statutes and international 
environmental impact provisions by country respectively). 
 62. Marceil Yeater & Lal Kurukulasuriya, Environmental Impact Assessment Legislation in Developing 
Countries, in UNEP'S NEW WAY FORWARD: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 257, 
260–61 (Sun Lin & Lal Kurukulasuriya eds., 1995); see also Peigi Wilson, Bondi Ogolla, Raúl Brañes & Lal 
Kurukulasuriya, Emerging Trends in National Environmental Legislation in Developing Countries, in UNEP’S 
NEW WAY FORWARD: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 185, 216 (Sun Lin & Lal 
Kurukulasuriya eds., 1995) (identifying more than seventy developing countries and economies in transition 
with EIA laws and regulations). 
 63. BARRY SADLER, INT'L ASS’N FOR IMPACT ASSESSMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF A 
CHANGING WORLD: EVALUATING PRACTICE TO IMPROVE PERFORMANCE (1996), 
https://www.ceaa.gc.ca/Content/2/B/7/2B7834CA-7D9A-410B-A4ED-FF78AB625BDB/iaia8_e.pdf. 
 64. ANNIE DONNELLY ET AL., INT’L INST. FOR ENV’T & DEV., A DIRECTORY OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
GUIDELINES (2d ed. 1998). 
 65. Email from Devani Adams, Attorney Research Fellow, Santa Clara University School of Law, to 
Tseming Yang, Professor of Law, Santa Clara Law School (Sept. 11, 2015, 11:26 AM PST) (on file with author) 
(documenting EIA legislation in the 1998 Donneli study). 
 66. See generally Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence of Global Environmental Law, 36 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 615 (2009). 
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particular doctrines of law by one country from another.”67 Such efforts have 
occurred through official and informal channels. Among the most prominent in 
this field have been the environmental governance capacity-building and law 
reform programs promoted and supported by the development aid arms of 
governments and intergovernmental organizations as well as the work of NGOs 
and academics.68 In such initiatives, the environmental governance and 
regulatory mechanism that is promoted with overwhelming frequency is EIA.69 
I myself have participated in such endeavors in the past, both in my role leading 
an environmental rule of law capacity-building program as well as in 
government service supervising technical assistance and cooperation efforts 
focused on environmental law.70  
Legal transplantation is rarely driven only by outside efforts. Its support in 
recipient nations usually arises out of a desire of those “with less developed legal 
systems [to use it as a tool] to ‘catch-up’ with more sophisticated systems 
already in place elsewhere.”71 In fact, without internal receptivity to such efforts, 
transplantation would not be durable. Most importantly, however, since “the 
goals of environmental regulation are largely the same across the world—
protecting human health and environmental public goods,”72 adoption of 
regulatory solutions that have been successful elsewhere is oftentimes efficient 
and sensible.  
In contrast, convergence of legal norms has been the consequence of less 
deliberate, purposive efforts. It is the result of legal systems adopting the same 
or analogous “response[s] to similar external pressures, especially 
environmental pressures.”73 Finally, integration and harmonization “refer to 
multi-country efforts of legal cooperation and standardization that result in 
similar legal approaches.”74 More purposive than convergence, governments 
may utilize formal international organizations and treaties to engage in joint 
efforts to promote uniformity or consistency with respect to common legal or 
 
 67. Id. at 626. 
 68. For a discussion of this type of capacity-building, training, and law reform assistance by the United 
Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization, see Morgera, supra note 4, at 260–61; and Tseming Yang, The 
Emerging Practice of Global Environmental Law, 1 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 53, 60 (2012) (discussing the 
capacity-building activities of EPA). 
 69. Another interesting example of copying relevant environmental legislation appears to be the British 
Town and Country Planning Act, which has been adopted across the Commonwealth world. See WINSTON 
ANDERSON, PRINCIPLES OF CARIBBEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 174 (2012).  
 70. That has included my past position as the Director of the U.S.-China Partnership for Environmental 
Law (a USAID and State Department-funded capacity-building program at Vermont Law School) and as Deputy 
General Counsel for International Environmental Law at the U.S. EPA. Such enterprises usually consist of 
training workshops, technical drafting and commenting assistance on legislative, regulatory, or policy 
documents, and memoranda that describe law, regulation and policy in other jurisdictions. They can be 
specifically designed to assist agency officials, judges, the practicing bar, and legal academics.  
 71. Yang & Percival, supra note 66, at 626. 
 72. Id. at 652. 
 73. Id. at 627. 
 74. Id. 
70.2-YANG (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2019  12:36 PM 
February 2019]         ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT DUTY 541 
regulatory issues.75 Climate change is a particularly relevant example, where the 
international regime addressing climate change has induced comparable actions 
at the national and sub-national level to advance common international 
objectives.  
The unintended consequence of globalization and the desired objectives of 
development aid, law reform, and promotion of the rule of law affect not only 
environmental issues but other fields of law as well. Yet, they have been 
particularly influential on environmental and natural resources law for reasons 
unique to this field. For example, global environmental challenges, such as 
climate change, have touched industrialized and developing nations alike. 
Contemporary environmental treaties represent the international community’s 
recognition of the importance of these issues and their translation into new 
international law. In turn, pressure to implement and comply with these treaty 
commitments has driven efforts of integration and harmonization of legal norms 
at the national and sub-national level.76  
Considering this background, the belief that the EIA duty has been a global 
norm of environmental law should not be surprising. The EIA norm has been 
widely adopted through transplantation efforts sponsored by the World Bank, 
UNEP, and the development agencies of various nations.77 Yet, previously, 
inquiry into how widely the norm had actually been adopted and the implications 
of such adoption had, with a few exceptions, not been systematic. Even though 
EIA processes are a favorite topic of academic writings by legal and policy 
scholars, lack of attention to systematic inquiry and empirical documentation of 
the EIA norm’s worldwide adoption has left its significance largely 
unappreciated among those unfamiliar with environmental law and policy tools. 
It has been referenced in only a few ICJ cases addressing transboundary 
environmental issues and has not been included in environmental treaties as a 
binding requirement on a regular basis. Based on that record, Professor John 
Knox went as far as to suggest in a 2002 article that the specific legal norm in 
the transboundary context, a transboundary EIA duty, was a myth.78  
While the requirements for the formation of customary international law 
norms in state practice and opinion juris may not be readily satisfied by 
contemporary state behavior and international norms, the pervasiveness of the 
EIA norm does beg the question of whether it carries some broader relevance to 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. These considerations also respond to a possible question about such global environmental norms—do 
such norms have the same substantive content or do they merely share the same name? To the extent that the 
drafters and those applying the norms share the same environmental purposes across jurisdictions, it seems that 
this would be a non-issue. In fact, frequent international conferences, international instruments, and application 
by international organizations have had a harmonizing effect on principles such as the EIA duty. 
 77. Anecdotal evidence includes my own personal experiences, though formal documentation of how 
widespread EIA transplantation efforts have become difficult to assess, especially since training materials are 
not usually published. 
 78. Knox, supra note 47, at 291. 
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international law. Before addressing that question in Part III, I will set out the 
results of the survey in the next Part.  
B. CONTEMPORARY UNIVERSALITY—THE SURVEY AND RESULTS 
The last comprehensive global study to survey EIA norms across the world 
was published almost two decades ago and found over 120 systems with some 
kind of EIA mechanism, even if not all imposed a legal duty. It showed that even 
at that time, EIA norms had already been widely adopted and regulators, 
activists, and judges have been applying them regularly.79 The purpose in 
conducting the present study was to determine whether, since that time, EIA 
adoption has spread significantly further among national legal systems.  
The study specifically focused on legislation or regulations that mandated 
the performance of EIA. Systems that merely authorized or suggested, but did 
not require, EIAs were not included in the count. Equally important, the survey 
generally did not concern itself with the effective enforcement of EIA norms.80 
As a general matter, the survey classified jurisdictions as having an EIA duty 
(“yes”), not imposing such a duty (“no”), or “unclear.” Below follows a 
description of the survey process and classification methodology as well as the 
results, with a chart summary of the results set out in Appendix 1. 
1. Scope 
The scope of the survey covered all countries with membership in the 
United Nations, as well as several nations and jurisdictions that have long been 
recognized as having independent regulatory authority over their territory. 
Because of their significance to infrastructure financing and their broad 
geographical scope of operation, the survey also examined the EIA policies of 
the major multilateral development banks and several national development aid 
agencies.  
The substantive focus of the study was the general umbrella norm—the 
duty to conduct an EIA for projects or activities that were likely to have a 
significant impact on the environment. For time and resource reasons, the survey 
did not attempt to classify subsidiary requirements such as scoping, the content 
of the EIA, or public participation.  
2. Survey Process and Methodology 
To classify jurisdictions, the survey relied on both secondary sources as 
well as primary source materials identified by myself and two research fellows. 
Information on national EIA legislation and regulations was pulled from online 
databases such as Ecolex, FAOLex, E-Law, the regional Legal Information 
Institutes, and national government websites. Secondary sources consulted 
 
 79. See generally DONNELLY ET AL., supra note 64. The Donnelly study was a comprehensive review of 
EIA practices across the world at the time.  
 80. See infra Subpart III.C.2. 
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included official government statements, reports by international organizations, 
impact assessment reports, judicial opinions, and the commentary and 
assessments of scholars and experts.  
The survey looked primarily to official English language sources as well 
as official translations, though we also utilized unofficial translations when we 
deemed them reliable based on the institutional source. My research fellows had 
good reading knowledge of French and Spanish and utilized those language 
skills in our survey. Thus, when legislative or regulatory materials were only 
available in Spanish or French, my research fellows would review such original 
legislative or regulatory text. More importantly, in order to minimize the 
possibility of legal misunderstanding, especially when legislative or regulatory 
text or meaning appeared to be ambiguous and when primary sources were only 
available in non-English languages, we always sought confirmation of our 
classification decisions in secondary sources. For jurisdictions where the 
primary materials were not available in English, French or Spanish, the survey 
had to rely exclusively on secondary sources (treatises, scholarly commentary, 
or institutional assessments) to determine whether there was an EIA duty in the 
relevant jurisdiction.  
In instances where we found disagreement among secondary sources or 
when no secondary sources were available to confirm classification as a 
jurisdiction that mandated EIA, the jurisdiction was included in the “unclear or 
unknown” category. I reviewed all classifications.81  
In examining confirming sources, whenever possible, we sought out 
official government communications, such as national reports to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity and the Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact 
Assessment in a Transboundary Context, and descriptions of the country’s EIA 
system on a government agency’s website. We also relied heavily on 
institutional assessments, such as country environmental evaluations by the 
OECD, the UNECE, various multilateral development banks (World Bank, 
Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank, Inter-American 
Development Bank), and the Netherlands Commission for Environmental 
Assessment. We considered these official statements and secondary sources to 
be the most reliable because they represented official governmental and 
institutional perspectives and were prepared by or in collaboration with national 
experts and oftentimes subject to review by the respective governments.82  
In addition, we also utilized scholarly publications as well environmental 
assessments prepared by multilateral developments banks, such as the World 
Bank, on specific projects. Environmental assessments by multilateral 
 
 81. As part of our survey process, we assembled a detailed database. See Global Environment Impact 
Assessment Norm Survey Part 1—Survey, CITIZEN YANG (Oct. 4, 2018), 
https://citizenyang.com/2018/10/04/global-environmental-impact-assessment-norm-survey-part-1-survey/. For 
a summary chart of the database, see Appendix 1. 
 82. For a list of the twenty-two sources, both organizations, articles, and websites that were used most 
heavily, see Appendix 2. 
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development banks often contained a section discussing the environmental 
regulatory system of the country seeking project financing and sometimes would 
explicitly discuss whether the jurisdiction had laws requiring EIAs.  
In almost all of our classification decisions, our survey sought at least two 
or more confirming secondary sources, though there were a few instances where 
we were only able to identify one confirming secondary source. As an exception, 
we did not seek more than one confirming source when the relevant jurisdiction 
was within the European Union, since there is no legal doubt that the EU EIA 
directive independently imposes the EIA duty on member states.  
In order to determine whether the EIA duty was legally mandated, we 
identified specific legislation or regulations that imposes that duty. In doing so, 
we also identified the year in which the regulation was promulgated or 
legislation enacted. Because our survey focused on the question whether each 
jurisdiction presently had an EIA mandate in place, it was not a priority for our 
survey to identify the legislation or regulation that first imposed the EIA duty 
with accuracy. Nevertheless, our research oftentimes did allow us to identify 
such information. Thus, if we became aware of earlier versions of the legislation 
or regulation that had first made EIA mandatory in that jurisdiction, we indicated 
that date in our database.83 It is worth pointing out that in some jurisdictions, the 
enactment of enabling legislation—that authorized EIA processes—was not 
coincident with the operationalization of EIA requirements by an implementing 
government agency. In many of those countries, implementing regulations that 
mandated EIA for projects did not come until quite a number of years later.84  
Conversely, there were a few occasions where the research suggested that 
the EIA legislation or regulation might have been amended subsequently. 
However, there was never an indication in our research that a government had 
taken the extraordinary step of repealing the EIA duty in its jurisdiction.  
It is also worth noting that Singapore is a jurisdiction that has no general 
EIA requirement, and was classified as such. However, the state does appear to 
engage in impact assessment in specific contexts.85  
 
 83. See supra note 81. Likewise, we did not actively attempt to establish the earliest date on which EIA 
became mandatory in that jurisdiction. Moreover, it was also my sense of the survey that establishing the precise 
year of establishment of the EIA duty would have been difficult for a number of jurisdictions, because many 
countries used trial or sectoral legislation as early attempts for establishing an EIA system. 
 84. For example, Malaysia first enacted EIA-authorizing legislation in 1974, but did not mandate it by 
regulation until 1987. See Environmental Quality Act 1974, Act 127, art. 34A (Malaysia), 
http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/mal13278.pdf; Environmental Quality (Prescribed Activities) 
(Environmental Impact Assessment) Order 1987, http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/mal13290.pdf; see also 
Peter King & Simon Hoiberg Olsen, Quick Study of EIA Practices in Some Asia-Pacific Countries and Beyond: 
Lessons for the Phillipines?, INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL ENVTL. STRATEGIES, at 6 (June 4, 2013), 
https://www.aecen.org/sites/default/files/eia_quick_study_olsen_king_0.pdf. 
 85. See U.S. AGENCY INT’L DEV., ASIAN ENVTL. COMPLIANCE & ENF’T NETWORK, BUILDING CAPACITY 
FOR EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENTS IN ASIA: RAPID ASSESSMENT FOR 
IDENTIFYING CAPACITY CHALLENGES AND PROGRAMMING OPPORTUNITIES 4 (2009), 
https://www.aecen.org/sites/default/files/AECEN%20Rapid%20Assessment%20on%20Regional%20EIA%20
Best%20Practices%20--%2012-09.pdf. 
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3. Survey Results 
The survey results indicate that the EIA norm, requiring an EIA when a 
project is likely to have a significant environmental impact, has been nearly 
universally adopted. The norm has now been adopted in at least 183 countries 
and jurisdictions.86 That includes codification in emerging economies and 
developing countries such as China, India, and Brazil, in the least developed 
nations in Africa, and in the former communist nations, such as the Russian 
Federation.87 Even politically isolated states such as North Korea88  
and Cuba89 have enacted EIA laws. Within the European Union and its member 
countries, Directive 85/33790 on EIA and Directive 2001/42 on strategic 
environmental assessments91 mandate it. Thus, since the 1998 Donnelly study,92 
the number of jurisdictions with a mandatory EIA norm has increased by more 
than fifty. 
Our survey also identified six states that did not possess an EIA 
requirement (South Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Suriname, Singapore, and Nauru), 
while we were unable to ascertain with sufficient confidence the status of eight 
other states (Central African Republic, Holy See, San Marino, Monaco, St. 
Vincent and Grenadines, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Barbados). 
C. TRENDS ACROSS THE WORLD 
As it appears across the world, the EIA norm is a statutory and regulatory 
concept that is oftentimes articulated with great precision. It is widely seen as 
advancing sustainable development since “without these assessments the project 
is against [the] principle of sustainable development.”93 EIA “is [part of] a very 
vital dynamic[] in planning for sustainable development”94 which “ensure[s] that 
development options under consideration are environmentally sound and 
 
 86. That count includes member states of the United Nations as well as the European Union, Palestine, and 
Taiwan. See sources cited supra note 81. 
 87. Fedal’nyi Zakon RF o Grazhadanstve Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Federal Law of the Russian Federation on 
Environmental Protection], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] Jan. 10, 2002 (Russ.); Fedal’nyi Zakon RF o 
Grazhadanstve Rossiiskoi [Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Ecological Expertise], SOBRANIE 
ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 1995, No. 
65, Item 3. 
 88. The Law on Environmental Impact Assessment (adopted by Decree No. 1367 of the Presidium of the 
Supreme People’s Assembly on Nov. 9, 2005) (North Korea). 
 89. Law No. 81 of the Environment, June 11, 1997 (Cuba). 
 90. Directive 85/337/EEC, supra note 30. The directive was most recently amended in 2014. See Directive 
2014/52/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 Apr. 2014 Amending Directive 2011/92/EU 
on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Public and Private Projects on the Environment, 2014 O.J. (L 124) 
1, 18. For a general overview of the EU directive, see Environmental Impact Assessment—EIA, EUR. 
COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/eia-legalcontext.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).  
 91. Directive 2001/42/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the 
Assessment of the Effects of Certain Plans and Programmes on the Environment, 2001 O.J. (L 197) 30, 37.  
 92. See generally DONNELLY ET AL., supra note 64. 
 93. Rodgers Muema Nzioka v. Tiomin Kenya Ltd. (2001) 2001 K.L.R. 97 (H.C.K.) (Kenya). 
 94. Advocates Coalition for Dev. & Env’t (ACODE) v. Attorney General, Case No. 0100 of 2004 (July 
13, 2005, High Court of Uganda at Kampala) (Uganda). 
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sustainable.”95 Even though a detailed and extensive analysis of the EIA statutes 
and regulations is beyond the scope of this Article, some anecdotal observation 
may be useful here to provide a sense of the patterns and trends encountered 
across the world.  
The process of research and assembly of the survey left us with the 
impression that EIA processes across the world are largely consistent with the 
descriptive summary of the 1998 Donnelly study. In general, EIA processes 
appear to contain five distinct stages. First is the screening stage, which inquires 
whether an impact assessment will be necessary. Screening is usually designed 
as a winnowing step for the elimination of projects and activities that are 
inconsequential with respect to the environment. Screening avoids wasting time, 
resources, and personnel effort necessary for a full-blown EIA process and 
conversely helps identify projects and issues that are deserving of closer and 
more careful scrutiny.96 The second stage consists of a preliminary assessment 
when the initial screening step fails to indicate definitively that a project will or 
will not have significant impacts.97 In the third stage, scoping, the EIA study 
seeks to determine which impacts, issues, and alternative options should be 
investigated. Ordinarily, it is also the stage when affected communities may be 
involved to ensure their early input into the process.98  
The fourth stage of the EIA study includes substantive fact gathering and 
analysis and preparation of the EIA document. It is also in this stage that impacts 
are predicted based on the available information and evaluated based on a variety 
of considerations, including legal requirements, policy objectives, and public 
views.99 In the final stage, after submission of the EIA document to the relevant 
decision-maker (and thus following the conclusion of the substantive fact-
gathering and evaluation process), come post-submission actions such as post-
project monitoring or post-project audits.100 Even though such evaluations are 
retrospective in nature, the ultimate purpose is to gather information that can be 
used prospectively to improve future EIA processes and to ensure compliance 
with conditions imposed on a project. 
Beyond the general steps described above, it is difficult to ascribe a 
uniform set of EIA process requirements to all jurisdictions. An important 
exception is the set of European Union member states, which must adhere to the 
EU directive on environmental impact assessments (and later amendments).  
The overwhelming majority of nations have general EIA laws, legislation 
of general applicability that covered all or most activities or projects with a 
potential for significant environmental impacts. However, a few jurisdictions, 
 
 95. Mundy v. Cent. Envtl. Auth., SC Appeal 58/2003 (Jan. 20, 2004, The Supreme Court of the Democratic 
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka) (Sri Lanka). 
 96. See DONNELLY ET AL., supra note 64, at 9–10 (“Screening helps to focus resources on those projects 
most likely to have significant impacts . . . .”). 
 97. Id. at 10. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 10–13. 
 100. Id. at 14. 
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including Andorra and DR Congo, apply EIA processes only on a sectoral basis, 
such as the mining industry, land development, infrastructure projects, or other 
specific sectors of the economy.101 
The most common approaches triggering the impact assessment duty fall 
into two general categories. Some jurisdictions apply a general legal standard 
that asks whether an activity or project, subject to its regulatory jurisdiction, 
poses a risk of significant adverse environmental impacts. For example, the 
United States falls into this group, requiring a showing that the action 
“significantly affect[] the quality of the human environment.”102 In practice, of 
course, EIA requirements under U.S. law are implemented in greater detail by 
agency-specific regulations where EIA processes are triggered both by specific 
lists of projects, activities, and actions as well as a residual catch-all requirement.  
The second approach relies primarily on a specific list of activities or 
projects that are automatically subject to more impact assessment scrutiny.103 
The list approach is usually designed to direct the attention of regulators to 
projects and activities that often come with significant environmental impacts. 
For example, Article 20 of Uganda’s 1995 National Environmental Statute 
requires that any “project described in the Third Schedule to this Statute” submit 
information to the government agency that allows it to determine the project’s 
potential impacts and their environmental significance, and based on that to 
trigger an appropriate environmental review.104 The schedule includes activities 
that are “out of character with [their] surroundings,” structures “of a scale not in 
keeping with [their] surroundings,” and “major changes in land use,” in addition 
to projects such as dams, transportation infrastructure, and mining activities.105 
Another jurisdiction that follows the list approach is the European Union.106  
The articulation of the sub-norms of the EIA duty, such as requirements 
regarding specific components of an EIA, involvement of the public, EIA 
document availability, and substantive role in the ultimate outcome vary among 
jurisdictions. However, judicial decisions on the adequacy of impact assessment 
studies in various jurisdictions also reveal many issues familiar to American 
environmental lawyers. For example, determinations of the significance of a 
 
 101. Email from Laura Davis, Attorney Research Fellow, Santa Clara University School of Law, to Anna 
Moles Mariné, Head of Landscape Unit, Biodiversity and Environmental Assessment, Andorra Department of 
Sustainability and Environment (May 19, 2017, 8:35 AM PST) (on file with author); DEV. BANK OF S. AFRICA, 
SADC ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION HANDBOOK 2012, at 103–04 (4th ed.), https://irp-
cdn.multiscreensite.com/2eb50196/files/uploaded/SADC%20Handbook.pdf. 
 102. 42 U.S.C. 4332(C) (2012). 
 103. National Environment Statute, 1995 (Statute No. 4 of 1995) art. 20(1) (Uganda). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id., at Schedules, sect. 20, art. 1. 
 106. Directive 2011/92/EU, of The European Parliament and of the Council of 13 Dec. 2011 on the 
Assessment of the Effects of Certain Public and Private Projects on the Environment, art. 2, 2012 O.J. (L 
26) 1, 21 (“Member States shall adopt all measures necessary to ensure that, before consent is given, 
projects likely to have significant effects on the environment by virtue, inter alia, of their nature, size or 
location are made subject to a requirement for development consent and an assessment with regard to their 
effects. Those projects are defined in Article 4.”).  
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project’s impacts are context dependent and cannot be based “only [on] the size 
of projects, without also taking their nature and location into consideration” 
since 
[e]ven a small-scale project can have significant effects on the environment if it 
is in a location where the environmental factors . . ., such as fauna and flora, soil, 
water, climate or cultural heritage, are sensitive to the slightest alteration. 
 
Similarly, a project is likely to have significant effects where, by reason of its 
nature, there is a risk that it will cause a substantial or irreversible change in those 
environmental factors, irrespective of its size.107  
Other issues that appear to be frequently encountered are concerns about 
the adequate analysis of available and reasonable alternative options,108 
improper segmentation or scoping of projects so as to avoid triggering 
significant impacts,109 and the requirement to include cumulative impacts in the 
analysis.110 A full-blown EIA analysis can be avoided through mitigation 
measures that abate significant environmental impacts,111 referred to as a 
mitigated FONSI (finding of no significant impact) in the United States. Finally, 
many jurisdictions, such as Liberia and Kenya, explicitly condition project 
approval on the grant of an EIA license that may be issued only after preparation 
of an EIA.112  
There are also court decisions suggesting significant deference and 
hesitancy to second-guess the judgment of government agencies when 
 
 107. Commission v. Ireland [1999], Case C-392/96, 1999 E.C.R. I-5901, ¶¶ 66–67 (Ir.).  
 108. Save Historic Newmarket Ltd. v. Forest Heath District Council [2011] EWHC 606 (Admin) [17] (Eng.) 
(“[T]he authority responsible for the adoption of the plan or programme as well as the authorities and public 
consulted must be presented with an accurate picture of what reasonable alternatives there are and why they are 
not considered to be the best option.”). 
 109. Ecologistas en Acción-CODA v. Ayuntamiento de Madrid, Case C-142/07, 2008 E.C.R. I-6097, ¶¶ 20, 
44 (Spain) (finding that “the Madrid City Council[’s] [decision to] split [a] larger ‘Madrid calle 30’ project into 
15 independent sub-projects, treated separately,” could not avoid an impact assessment if “taken together, they 
are likely to have significant effects on the environment”).  
 110. Minister for the Environment and Heritage v. Queensland Conservation Council Inc. [2004] FCAFC 
190 (Austl.) (concluding that, in the approval process for construction and operation of a dam, it was improper 
to ignore the impacts by persons using water from the dam, other than the project proponent). 
 111. Tim Busienei, Dr. v. Dir. Gen.—Nat’l Env’t Mgmt. Auth. (NEMA) (2007), National Environmental 
Tribunal Appeal No. 10 (Kenya) (concluding that effective soundproofing of a metal fabricating workshop 
mitigated noise pollution impacts and therefore indicated no adverse impact on the environment); MiningWatch 
Can. v. Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), [2010] 1 S.C.R. 6 (Can.) (improper scoping of project); T. Murugandam 
& Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. 23, (2012) National Green Tribunal Appeal No. 50/2012 (India) (requiring 
analysis of cumulative impacts in considering a proposal for a coal-fired power plant). Some courts have also 
sought to require climate change effects in impact analysis, Gray v The Minister for Planning and Ors. [2006] 
NSWLEC 720 (Austl.), while in an instance raising environmental justice issues, the required impact analysis 
was narrowed, Jamii Bora Charitable Tr. v. Dir. Gen. Nat’l Env’t Mgmt. Auth. (2005) National Environmental 
Tribunal Appeal No. NET/02/03/2005 (Kenya). 
 112. An Act Adopting the Environment Protection and Management Law of the Republic of Liberia, §§ 6, 
23 (2002), http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/lbr53038.pdf; Environmental Management and Co-ordination 
Act (rev. ed. 2012) Cap. 387 §§ 58, 63 (Kenya), http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/ken41653.pdf. 
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examining the adequacy of EIA documents,113 but also a willingness to order 
EIA process to be conducted or completed even after projects have been 
approved and construction has commenced.114 Some cases suggest that public 
participation in the EIA process enjoys significant support in the courts, even 
when government bureaucracies do not always facilitate it.115 Other judicial 
opinions show significant variability in approaches to standing (“locus standi”) 
to challenge EIA processes. Though some jurisdictions, such as Japan,116 appear 
to be quite restrictive on standing, many others have more liberal standing 
requirements.  
The newest aspect of EIA processes that is spreading across the world is 
strategic environmental assessment, such as embodied in EU Directive 
2001/42/EC. While the terminology may be unfamiliar to American NEPA 
practice, it is essentially the application of EIA process not only to specific 
projects but also to broad government programs and plans, that is 
“programmatic” impact assessments. Since courts interpret NEPA’s “major 
federal actions” trigger to encompass both specific projects and government 
programs,117 such strategic EIAs are generally captured within NEPA’s existing 
requirements. 
III.  THE EIA DUTY AS AN ARTICLE 38 GENERAL PRINCIPLE  
Apart from demonstrating worldwide acceptance of the EIA norm in 
national systems, the survey’s finding also has significance for public 
international law. Even though the EIA duty has not been regularly included in 
treaties,118 and scholars have expressed doubt that it is part of customary 
international law,119 the norm’s widespread acceptance means that it has been 
 
 113. Belize All. of Conservation Non-Governmental Orgs. v. Dep’t of the Env’t & Belize Electric Co. Ltd. 
[2004] UKPC 6 (Belize) (refusing to overturn a dam approval in spite of errors); see also DANIELLE ANDRADE 
ET AL., CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT PROCESS 
IN BELIZE AND JAMAICA 430 (2011); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2006Du330, Mar. 26, 2006 (S. Kor.); Sutton v. 
Canterbury Reg’l Council, [2015] NZHC 313 (N.Z.). 
 114. Friends of the Oldman River Soc’y v. Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Can.); 
Magaliesberg Prot. Ass’n v. MEC: Dep’t of Agriculture & Ors. 2013 (563/2012) [2013] ZASCA 80 (May 30) 
(S. Afr.); Sarstoon-Temash Inst. for Indigenous Mgmt. (SATIIM) v. Forest Dep’t, Ministry of Nat. Res. & Env’t, 
Sept. 26, 2006, Claim No. 212 of 2006 (Belize). 
 115. See, e.g., Adivasi Majdoor Kisan Ekta Sangthan & Ors. v. Ministry of Env’t & Forests, (2011) National 
Green Tribunal Appeal No. 3/2011 (India). In Adivasi, a public hearing was not held at an easily accessible 
venue for the people affected, a summary of the draft EIA was not posted on a website and the public was not 
informed of the contents of EIA Report of the project. In fact, a public melee broke out, which led to police 
intervention and continuation of the meeting. Id. ¶¶ 10–11. 
 116. Saikō-Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 7, 2005, GyoHi no. 114, 59 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HARNREISHU 
[MINSHŪ] (Japan) (allowing standing only for residents within the government’s designated “relevant areas,” 
even though the dissent pointed out that a linkage already acknowledged by the government). 
 117. See, e.g., MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 14, §§ 9:01–9:09. 
 118. But see Gillespie, supra note 24 (describing a multitude of international institutions where EIA 
processes have been applied). 
 119. See generally Knox, supra note 47. 
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absorbed into public international law by attaining status as a General Principle 
of Law.  
In international law, the concept of “General Principles of Law” inquires 
into whether certain legal principles are the subject of a transnational consensus 
such that they may be deemed legally binding everywhere, including in the 
international system. Such legal principles, as a result, are applicable not only 
within national and subnational legal systems but also between states as a matter 
of international law. 
A.  ARTICLE 38 OF THE ICJ—“GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW RECOGNIZED BY 
CIVILIZED NATIONS” 
As environmental law has spread across the world’s national legal systems, 
so too has it evolved within international law. All three primary sources of 
international law have been significant in that evolution. One of the most widely 
used articulations of these three sources is found in Article 38 of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice, which describes them as: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by . . . states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.120 
Among these three, however, international treaties have undoubtedly been 
the most important in that process, especially as embodied in iconic global 
conventions such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
Customary law has often been less visible, though as its role in creating the Trail 
Smelter rule121—prohibiting the use of one’s territory to cause transboundary 
environmental harm—demonstrates, it can be no less influential.122 
 
 120. ICJ Statute, supra note 3, art. 38. Article 38 also indicates that “judicial decisions” and scholarly 
publications can be utilized “as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.” Id. The Restatement 
Third of Foreign Relations has provided the following articulation: 
(1) A rule of international law is one that has been accepted as such by the international community 
of states 
(a) in the form of customary law; 
(b) by international agreement; or 
(c) by derivation from general principles common to the major legal systems of the world. 
(2) Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by 
them from a sense of legal obligation. 
(3) International agreements create law for the states parties thereto and may lead to the creation of 
customary international law when such agreements are intended for adherence by states generally 
and are in fact widely accepted. 
(4) General principles common to the major legal systems, even if not incorporated or reflected in 
customary law or international agreement, may be invoked as supplementary rules of international 
law where appropriate. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 121. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1938); see also Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 
3 R.I.A.A. 1938 (1941) (further proceedings). 
 122. For elaboration on these issues, see discussion infra Subpart III.B. 
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In contrast, “General Principles of Law” has been the least-known form of 
international law and has generally received little attention in international 
environmental law.123 Judge Trindade of the ICJ described general principles as 
“guiding principles of general content” that transcend the “rules of positive 
international law.”124 They “comprise[] those principles common to national 
legal systems and to international law” and are “legal postulates followed ‘in 
national legal systems and in international law.’”125 Mark Janis has put it most 
plainly, referring to a general principle as a “proposition of law so fundamental 
that it will be found in virtually every legal system.”126 
Among the fundamental legal norms deemed to be effectively universal are 
the duty to make reparations for breach of an engagement,127 estoppel,128 res 
judicata,129 good faith in the exercise of rights,130 responsibility based on fault,131 
and judicial equality of parties.132 Thus, the general principle of having to make 
reparations for breach of an engagement, for example, may be thought of as the 
basis for specific contract law rules of compensation, restitution, or specific 
performance.  
 
 123. The notable exceptions have been the opinions of Judge Weeramantry in the Gabcicovo-Nagymoros 
case and Judge Trindade in the Pulp Mills case. The most prominent work surveying the host of general 
principles remains Bin Cheng’s 1987 work, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and 
Tribunals. See generally BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
AND TRIBUNALS (1987). 
 124. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), 2010 I.C.J Rep. 14, 135, ¶ 39 (Apr. 20) (separate 
opinion by Trindade, J.). 
 125. Id. ¶ 40 (quoting G. I. Tunkin, “General Principles of Law” in International Law, in INTERNATIONALE 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ALFRED VERDROSS 526, 531 (René Marcic et al eds., 1971) (Ger.)). 
 126. MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 56 (4th ed. 2003). For other scholarly 
definitions of “General Principles,” see M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Functional Approach to “General Principles of 
International Law,” 11 MICH. J. INT’L L. 768, 770–71 (1990). 
 127. CHENG, supra note 123, at 233; see also Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. 
(ser. A) No. 17, ¶ 73 (Sept. 13) (“[I]t is a principle of international law, and even a general conception of law, 
that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation. . . . reparation is the indispensable 
complement of a failure to apply a convention, and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention 
itself.”).  
 128. CHENG, supra note 123, at 141; see also Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. 
Thai.), Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. Rep. 6, 31, 32, 39–51, 61–65 (June 15); Case Concerning the Arbitral Award Made 
by the King of Spain (Hond. v. Nicar.), Judgment, 1960 I.C.J. Rep. 192 (Nov. 18); Case Concerning the Payment 
of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (Fr. v. Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes), Judgment, 1929 
P.C.I.J., (ser. A), No. 20, at 38–39. (July 12). 
 129. CHENG, supra note 123, at 336; see also Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United 
Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. Rep. 47 (July 13); Haya De La Torre Case 
(Colom. v. Peru) (1951), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 71, 77, 80, 82 (June 13); Societe Commerciale De Belgique 
(Belg. v. Greece), Judgment, 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 78, at 174 (June 15).  
 130. CHENG, supra note 123, at 121; see also Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 
253 (Dec. 20).  
 131. CHENG, supra note 123, at 218.  
 132. Id. at 290; see also Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. 
A/B) No. 53, at 25–26 (Sept. 5); Factory at Chorzow, 1928 P.C.I.J., ¶ 8 (“The other Party must always have an 
opportunity of commenting on the amended submissions.”). Other principles invoked by the International Court 
Justice include the principle of self-determination of peoples, the principle of good faith, and others. See Pulp 
Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, 135, ¶¶ 23–24 (Apr. 20) (separate opinion 
by Trindade, J.). 
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Traditionally, the General Principles provision has been used as a gap-
filler, designed to spring into action when the ICJ cannot find any applicable 
treaty or customary norm in the matter before it.133 Yet, it is formally a co-equal 
to custom and treaties.134  
The origins of the General Principles provision of Article 38 can be found 
“in the compromis [provisions] of arbitral tribunals of the nineteenth century.”135 
General Principles were first included in the governing statute of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice, the 1920 League of Nations precursor to the 
contemporary International Court of Justice.136  
The provision was the subject of debate within the Advisory Committee of 
Jurists, the body charged with drafting the 1920 statute. Committee President 
Edward Descamps of Belgium espoused natural law concepts in the gap-filler 
provision, while Elihu Root of the United States advocated a positivist provision, 
derived from notions of law and justice based on domestic law.137 There 
appeared to be little doubt, however, that—as expressed by Lord Phillimore of 
the U.K.—General Principles included “those accepted by all nations in foro 
domestico,”138 to the extent they apply to an international setting.139 The 
eventual language came from a joint Phillimore-Root proposal, found in the 
language of Article 38(3) of the PCIJ and Article 38(1)(c) of the current ICJ 
(which adopted the PCIJ provision without change).140 
Both perspectives, natural law and positivist (as identified through a 
comparative law analysis), are not exclusive of each other and have continued 
to influence how general principles are understood.141 In practice, they are 
 
 133. JANIS, supra note 126, at 56 (“When treaties and customary international law fail to offer a needed 
international rule, a search may be launched in comparative law to discover if national legal systems use a 
common principle. If such a common principle is found, then it is presumed that a comparable principle should 
be attributed to fill the gap in international law.”); see also Case 155/79, AM & S Europe Limited v. Commission 
of the European Communities, 1982 E.C.R. 1575. 
 134. The Restatement (Third) on Foreign Relations of the United States has noted that General Principles 
are “a secondary source of international law, resorted to for developing international law interstitially in special 
circumstances.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1987). To the extent that the Restatement seeks to emphasize that General Principles are interstitial in 
nature and, as such, are background norms that do not preempt custom or treaty, the Restatement provides no 
substantive disagreement. 
 135. JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (8th ed. 2012); see 
also Rüdiger Wolfrum, General International Law (Principles, Rules, and Standards), in MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L. ¶¶ 23–24 (2010), 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1408. 
 136. CRAWFORD, supra note 135, at 34. 
 137. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, 2010 I.C.J. at 135, ¶ 11. See generally PCIJ/Advisory Committee of 
Jurists, Procès-verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee (16 June–24 July 1920) with Annexes, The Hague, 
Van Langenhuysen Frères, 1920, point No. 3, p. 306, Ann. No. 3. 
 138. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, 2010 I.C.J. at 135, ¶ 11. 
 139. See CRAWFORD, supra note 135, at 35. 
 140. Bin Cheng suggests that Descamps’ view incorporating natural law ideas won out. CHENG, supra note 
123, at 233.  
 141. More simply put, the former might be described as focused on general principles of international law 
and the latter as general principles of municipal law. However, Professor Oscar Schachter has gone as far as 
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derived either from inquiries into the nature of international law or into the 
substantive doctrines of municipal/national legal systems. In academic literature 
and judicial opinions, identification of general principles has involved a mix of 
the two methods, oftentimes even involving “an exercise in comparative law”142 
to determine a consensus of national legal systems on the principle. In practice, 
however, it is often unclear which of the two bases a scholar or a tribunal has 
relied on for the conclusion that a norm is a general principle of law.143 Even in 
arbitral decisions, when general principles are oftentimes examined from a 
comparative vantage point, there has been little effort to engage in a careful 
examination of the principle’s broad adherence or pervasiveness “in the 
municipal law of nations in general.”144  
In the specific context of the environment, general principles have not 
played much of a role. When they have been examined more carefully, 
international law scholars and jurists have tended to focus their inquiries into the 
distillation of such principles from the nature of the international system and 
their conceptual importance or necessity, as opposed to engaging in a 
comparative law analysis.145 Such discussions have generally not addressed the 
 
parsing “general principles of law” into five distinct categories: (1) “principles of municipal law ‘recognized by 
civilized nations’”; (2) principles “derived from the specific nature of the international community”; (3) 
principles “intrinsic to the idea of law and basic to all legal systems”; (4) principles “valid through all kinds of 
societies in relationships of hierarchy and co-ordination”; and (5) principles “founded on ‘the very nature of man 
as a rational and social being.’” See LORI FISLER DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 118 (4th ed. 2001). Another typology divides general principles into three categories: “(1) principles 
of approach and interpretation to legal relationships of all kinds; (2) minimum standards of procedural fairness; 
(3) substantive principles of law sufficiently widely and firmly recognized in the leading legal systems of the 
world to be regarded as international legal principles.” Wolfgang Friedmann, The Uses of “General Principles” 
in the Development of International Law, 57 AM. J. INT’L L. 279, 287 (1963). Finally, Professor Wolfrum has 
provided the following categories:  
[P]rinciples derived from municipal law; principles having their origin directly in international 
relations; principles recognized in all kinds of legal relations, regardless of the legal order to which 
they may belong; [] principles of legal logic, which determine the legal consequences resulting from 
the interrelation of two legal situations. . . . [and] principles developed or [] set out in one particular 
treaty regime and which are or may be transferred to others . . . . 
Wolfrum, supra note 135, ¶ 29. 
 142. JANIS, supra note 126, at 56. 
 143. See, e.g., Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Research on the General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized 
Nations, 51 AM. J. INT’L L. 734 (1957). Professor Wolfrum has gone further in noting past concerns about the 
difficulties of engaging in systematic comparative law analyses and “that the relevant material may not be 
available and the research task impossible to accomplish.” Wolfrum, supra note 135, ¶ 31. In general, the ICJ 
has tended to “assert the existence of general principles intuitively.” Id. Similarly, the late Jonathan Charney 
pointed out the Court has tended “to treat [such] rules as axiomatic without showing which domestic legal 
systems, if any, use them.” Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 536 
(1993). 
 144. DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 141, at 126. 
 145. Accord Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Formation of Customary International Law and General Principles, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 449, 461–62 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 
2007); Wolfrum, supra note 135, ¶¶ 48–51; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 
I.C.J. Rep. 14, 135, ¶ 11 (Apr. 20) (separate opinion by Trindade, J.). 
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extent that the relevant legal norm is found in national legal systems. In fact, it 
has been noted that: 
[I]t is generally accepted that the distillation of a “general principle of law 
recognised [sic] by civilized nations” does not require the comprehensive survey 
of all legal systems of the world as this would involve a practical impossibility 
and has never been the practice of the International Court of Justice or other 
international tribunals which have had recourse to Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ 
Statute.146  
The comparative law approach drew special scholarly attention in the 
1950s and 60s.147 The most prominent study of that time was initiated by Rudolf 
Schlesinger and announced in the pages of the American Journal of 
International Law.148 Schlesinger envisioned his effort as something akin to a 
global restatement of law that could yield global principles of law. His global 
equivalent of the fifty-state survey was to enable the identification of a “common 
core” of legal norms among the family of nations,149 what others also referred to 
as “world common law.”150 
Though Schlesinger’s project drew quite a bit of scholarly interest at the 
time,151 the project was not without its critics.152 And in hindsight, given the 
immensity and ambitiousness of the task, especially at a time when simply 
collecting and understanding the laws of the world’s nations must have been a 
serious challenge in itself, a comparative law approach to identifying general 
principles was bound to be a frustrating exercise. In fact, scholars have suggested 
 
 146. Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges 
McDonald and Vohrah, ¶ 57 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997). Before the Appeals 
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Judges McDonald and Vorah did 
engage in a survey of a variety of national jurisdictions to determine whether duress could be a defense to a war 
crimes charge but found no such principle. See generally MARK WESTON JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 159 (5th ed. 2014). 
 147. See John N. Hazard, The General Principles of Law, 52 AM. J. INT’L L. 91 (1958); see also Pulp Mills 
on the River Uruguay, 2010 I.C.J. ¶ 37 nn. 41–42. 
 148. Schlesinger, supra note 143, at 751. Related efforts have been referred to as efforts, such as by 
Professors Wilfred Jenks and Wolfgang Friedmann, to identify a “‘common law of mankind’ to meet problems 
raised by humanitarian concerns, environmental threats and economic relations.” DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 
141, at 119; C. WILFRED JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND (1958). 
 149. Rudolf B. Schlesinger, The Common Core of Legal Systems an Emerging Subject of Comparative 
Study, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW: LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HESSEL E. 
YNTEMA 65, 65 (Kurt H. Nadelmann et al. eds., 1961). 
 150. See Hazard, supra note 147, at 91 (quoting William G. Rice, Book Review, 10 J. LEGAL EDUC. 122, 
128 (1957) (reviewing PHILLIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956)); see also DAMROSCH ET AL., supra 
note 141, at 119.  
 151. Percy E. Corbett, The Search for General Principles of Law, 47 VA. L. REV. 811, 823–26 (1961). 
Wolfgang Friedmann noted at the time that “the science of comparative law can render invaluable and 
indispensable service to the many developing new fields of international law” by helping to explain what 
principles of law from national legal systems might be useful internationally. Friedmann, supra note 141, at 290. 
 152. See, e.g., Frances T. Freeman Jalet, The Quest for the General Principles of Law Recognized by 
Civilized Nations—a Study, 10 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1081–83, 1085 (1963) (noting the “danger in the 
comparative approach”); see also Jaye Ellis, General Principles and Comparative Law, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 949, 
971 (2011) (“[The] quest for a universally shared body of legal rules or concepts is probably futile.”). 
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that, in other contexts, such comparative analytical exercises seems to have 
borne little fruit.153  
In the end, Schlesinger’s ultimate goal remained unfulfilled.154 In spite of 
the initial enthusiasm surrounding the project, the immensity of the task 
eventually led to a significant narrowing of the project—a comparative study on 
the formation of contracts across several jurisdictions. The eventual output, a 
book, took ten years to complete, though it constituted a product of considerable 
importance.155 
B. WHY CONSIDER THE PROMISE OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW FOR THE 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT? 
Some international jurists have explicitly recognized the significance of 
General Principles of Law for international environmental law. In a separate 
opinion in the Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, Vice 
President Weeramantry argued that sustainable development should be 
recognized as a general principle of law.156 And in the Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay case, Judge Trindade penned a separate opinion that discussed in wide-
ranging terms the relevance of General Principles of Law for the environment, 
suggesting such status for the principles of prevention, precaution and 
sustainable development.157 However, broader mainstream appreciation of the 
role that General Principles could play in advancing the development of 
international environmental law has been elusive.  
At the most basic level, General Principles of law supplement the norm-
creation of treaty and custom through interstitial law-making, the gap-filling 
function.158 Their promise for advancing the development of international 
 
 153. Christopher A. Ford, Judicial Discretion in International Jurisprudence: Article 38(1)(C) and 
“General Principles of Law,” 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 35, 67–71 (1994); Robert Y. Jennings, Book Review, 
97 AM. J. INT'L L. 725, 727 (2003) (reviewing DAVID J. BEDERMAN, THE SPIRIT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002)) 
(“[O]ne can readily agree with Bederman that the so-called general principles of law have not been important in 
practice, and now probably never will be.”). 
 154. V. D. DEGAN, SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 102 (1997) (“Rudolf Schlesinger, professor of 
comparative law from Cornell Law School, in an article published in 1957 announced such a project, which as 
we know has never been accomplished.” (citing Schlesinger, supra note 143)). 
 155. See 1 FORMATIONS OF CONTRACTS: A STUDY OF THE COMMON CORE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS (Rudolf B. 
Schlesinger ed., 1968). Some scholars have described this work as Schlesinger’s crowning achievement. William 
C. Whitford, Book Review, Formation of Contracts: A Study of the Common Core of Legal Systems, 1970 WIS. 
L. REV. 234, 317 (reviewing Whitford’s book and pointing out some flaws in Schlesinger’s project (for example, 
only one reporter from each country discussed each legal system, the project took many years, was it worth the 
cost?, and should it have included an empirical dimension on the impact of the rules in each country)); Bertram 
F. Willcox, Rudolf B. Schlesinger—World Lawyer, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 919, 922–23 (1975). 
 156. Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagumaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, 
88 (Sept. 25) (separate opinion of Weeramantry, V.P.). 
 157. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 204 (Apr. 20). Some 
of the leading international environmental law textbooks devote significant coverage to various principles, such 
as intergenerational equity, duty of prevention, precaution, and others. See, e.g., DAVID HUNTER ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 433–500 (5th ed. 2015).  
 158. But see Bassiouni, supra note 126, at 769 (suggesting that General Principles will become the “most 
important and influential source of international law” for pressing international issues such as the environment). 
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environmental law may be best appreciated through a brief examination of how 
international environmental law norms have traditionally been generated in 
customary law and treaties and the challenges encountered in these norm-
creation processes.  
As is well known, customary international law is made up of the set of legal 
rules constituting the “general practice [of nations] accepted as law.”159 Thus, 
legal norms must meet two primary characteristics to qualify: (1) state practice 
and (2) opinio juris. These two criteria also pose significant limitations on the 
ability of Customary International Law (CIL) to generate new norms of 
international environmental law. For example, to demonstrate state practice, one 
must find wide-spread conformance. In turn, opinio juris requires that 
conformance be the result of a belief that the state practice is legally required. In 
other words, states must engage in the relevant behavior due to a sense of legal 
obligation—as opposed to a sense of moral commitment or convenience. 
Finding empirical evidence demonstrating both criteria has been a serious 
challenge.  
A further issue arises out of the lengths of time over which customs 
ordinarily arise. While it has been pointed out that customary norms can emerge 
quickly nowadays,160 most norms of customary law have evolved over the 
course of centuries in areas of international relations where states have had 
extensive and frequent interactions, such as diplomatic rights and immunities as 
well as the rules governing maritime navigation. Given that international 
environmental law has emerged only over the past five decades as an 
independent field of public international law, there have only been limited 
opportunities to observe relevant state actions and opinio juris.161 The longest-
standing and best-known customary environmental norm is the duty not to cause 
 
Perhaps, with contemporary technology, the promise of comparative law research will eventually yield “a far 
greater number of very detailed, generally recognized principles of law than anyone would have expected.” 
Werner Lorenz, General Principles of Law: Their Elaboration in the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 7–8 (1964). 
 159. ICJ Statute, supra note 3, art. 38(b). 
 160. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 reporter’s 
note 2 (AM. LAW. INST. 1987) (“The practice necessary to create customary law may be of comparatively short 
duration.”). 
 161. In fact, even the transboundary environmental harm prohibition has been the subject of criticism in 
regard to how it satisfies the customary law criteria. For example, Professor Daniel Bodansky has noted that, in 
spite of the normative perception that international law prohibits transboundary pollution, this norm has had  
little grounding in the observed behavior of states vis-à-vis each other:  
Would the proverbial Martian coming to Earth be able to induce these norms by observing what 
states do? The short answer seems to be ‘no.’ Consider, for example, the duty to prevent 
transboundary pollution, generally viewed as one of the most firmly established norms of customary 
international environmental law. Although I am unaware of any systematic empirical study of this 
issue, transboundary pollution seems much more the rule than the exception in interstate relations. 
Pollutants continuously travel across most international borders through the air and by rivers and 
ocean currents. 
Daniel Bodansky, Customary (and not so Customary) International Environmental Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 105, 110–11 (1995) (footnotes omitted). 
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transboundary environmental harm, first articulated in the 1930s Trail Smelter 
Arbitration.162 While this norm has enjoyed widespread consensus about its 
legally binding nature in the international law community, there has been far less 
agreement about other environmental norms.  
In contrast, the extended periods of time necessary for customary norms to 
emerge has not been an issue for treaty-making. Even though environmental 
agreements now require multi-year negotiation processes, the process is still far 
quicker. More importantly, treaties represent a targeted approach to 
environmental problem-solving based on an inter-governmental consensus that 
new international environmental legal norms are necessary and should be 
articulated through the written legal commitments accepted by state parties.163  
Undoubtedly, environmental treaties have advanced international 
environmental law by leaps and bounds, successfully creating institutional 
structures to support global environmental cooperation in many areas. 
Nevertheless, environmental treaty-making has encountered its own challenges.  
For example, modern multilateral treaty-negotiations, adhering to UN-
style processes, can easily involve hundreds of nations and tens of thousands of 
interested non-governmental and business participants, creating an exceedingly 
cumbersome, complex, and costly dynamic.  
Success in creating new binding legal norms has also been limited. 
Ordinarily, not all commitments included in an agreement are legally binding—
only those norms by which the parties have explicitly expressed a desire to be 
bound.164 Such commitments are the subject of careful negotiation, usually 
narrowly drafted, and limited in number. And even then, they are oftentimes 
qualified with terms that water down their obligatory nature, for example by 
conferring significant implementation discretion or creating ambiguity as to 
when such an obligation is breached.165  
One well-known example is the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement,166 which 
requires the submission of pledges to reduce national greenhouse gas emission 
as its primary legally binding commitment. To achieve the treaty’s core 
objective of emission reduction, each country has a legal obligation to submit a 
document with the “nationally determined contributions that it intends to 
 
 162. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1938); see also Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 
3 R.I.A.A. 1938 (1941) (further proceedings). See generally John E. Read, The Trail Smelter Dispute, 1 CAN. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 213 (1963) (providing an overview of the Trail Smelter arbitration). 
 163. Environmental agreements have characteristics of both contract and legislation—contract, in that the 
binding nature of the commitments are solely based on the consent of the parties to the agreement, and 
legislation, because the commitments are made by sovereigns and become legal norms which constitute a part 
of international law. 
 164. In practical terms, that usually means that commitments designated as a “shall” are binding, while those 
described as “should,” are hortatory rather than binding in nature. 
 165. One important reason is that states have been reluctant to create legally binding and enforceable norms, 
partially for fear of their own non-compliance.  
 166. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its 
Twenty-First Session, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Nov. 30–Dec. 15, 2015). 
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achieve,” that is, official promises of its emission reduction goals.167 However, 
the substantive emission reduction goals embodied in these pledges are not in 
themselves legally binding—only the requirement to submit Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDC) is as well as associated reporting and 
transparency requirements.168 In fact, very little of a substantive nature in the 
Paris Agreement is legally binding. 
In the end, the issues with these two prevailing modes of legal norm 
creation in the environmental field are noteworthy because they stand in marked 
contrast to the explosive growth of environmental laws at the national and 
subnational level across the world. That has been especially visible in the rapid 
rise of environmental law in developing nations. One might even suggest that 
the development of binding international environmental legal norms in treaties 
and customary law has fallen far behind its national counterparts.  
Of course, custom and treaty continue to be the two prevailing modes of 
creating new international law and are thus indispensable for the foreseeable 
future. However, their faults and weaknesses suggest that scholars, diplomats, 
and activists could benefit from looking to under-utilized supplementary sources 
of law, such as the General Principles, to advance the evolution of international 
environmental law. That option is now particularly promising in light of 
technological developments and globalization that facilitate the comparative law 
study of the rapidly evolving national environmental law systems.  
C. DOES THE EIA NORM QUALIFY AS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF LAW UNDER 
ARTICLE 38? 
Does the EIA duty qualify as a “general principle of law recognized by 
civilized nations?”169 In light of the survey, my answer is yes. 
The text of Article 38(1) sets out three requirements that a norm proponent 
would have to meet in order to make the case for a General Principle of Law: 
(1) identification of an appropriate legal principle, (2) that is recognized as law, 
and (3) accepted by “civilized nations.”170 As alluded to above, there are two 
different approaches to determining whether the three criteria are met. First, one 
can examine the EIA norm through a natural law lens and ask whether the 
principle is foundational to international law. Judge Trindade took this approach 
in his concurrence to the Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay case. The second, 
alternative approach is evaluation of the norm through a comparative law 
perspective—the logical corollary of our study. I apply the latter approach here. 
 
 167. Id. art. 4(2). 
 168. Id. art. 4(8)–(13). 
 169. ICJ Statute, supra note 3, art. 38(1)(c). 
 170. ICJ Statute, supra note 3, art. 38(1). 
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1. “General Principle of Law”: Specific Rules vs. Concepts  
The first criterion requires identification of a norm that can be articulated 
as a general legal principle. The implicit question of how general or how specific 
such a principle should be has led some scholars to suggest that Article 38’s 
textual articulation requires rejection of “specific rules.” They argue that the 
drafters meant to encompass only norms of a more general  
nature.171 Thus, “Lord Phillimore, who proposed the formula, explained that by 
General Principles of Law he meant ‘maxims of law.’”172 Professor Rüdiger 
Wolfrum has explained the distinction by saying that general principles are 
“obligations . . . described in abstract rather than concrete terms ready for direct 
application.”173  
Of course, defining a legal principle at an exceedingly high level of 
generality would make the principle unusable in practice. Though generality and 
abstraction would make it easy to document universality of acceptance, it might 
also make the principle incapable of providing substantial guidance in the 
resolution of specific legal issues. At the same time, defining a norm at an 
excessive level of specificity would arguably trigger a self-correcting dynamic. 
It could potentially leave the principle with few applications outside of an 
exceedingly narrow context and thus be useless as an articulation of a broadly 
applicable “legal maxim.”  
As a practical matter, these concerns are not likely to present serious issues. 
If a legal principle is the subject of a “true” universal normative consensus, 
criticism that the identified principle is too specific should not be fatal to and 
would not deny an underlying normative consensus. All it would suggest is that 
the norm may be capable of articulation as a more generic and abstract norm.174 
In other words, there would be a natural tendency for self-correction through re-
articulation of the norm in a more generic form. 
Within our survey, the application of this criterion to the EIA norm does 
not present serious difficulty. Undoubtedly, national and international (primarily 
multi-development banks, or “MDBs”) regulatory mechanisms that implement 
the EIA duty usually incorporate a number of subsidiary norms and duties with 
 
 171. Bin Cheng has noted that “[p]rinciples are to be distinguished from rules” because 
“A rule . . . is essentially practical and, moreover, binding; there are rules of art as there are rules of 
government, while a principle expresses a general truth, which guides our action, serves as a 
theoretical basis for the various acts of our life, and the application of which to reality produces a 
given consequence.” 
CHENG, supra note 123, at 24 (alteration in original) (quoting Gentini Case (It. v. Venez.) 10 R.I.A.A. 551 (Perm. 
Ct. Arb. 1903)). 
 172. Id. at 24. 
 173. Wolfrum, supra note 135, ¶ 6. The semantics of this issue has apparently caused some scholarly 
handwringing, though with little concrete articulation of the practical significance. See, e.g., Jalet, supra note 
152, at 1046. 
 174. This conclusion seems to have been implied by Michael Bogdan. Michael Bogdan, General Principles 
of Law and the Problem of Lacunae in the Law of Nations, 46 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT INT’L RET 37, 48–49 (1977). 
At the same time, one could not expect the converse, a norm that has been formulated too generically, to 
necessarily have a more specific counterpart that is still universally accepted. 
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respect to the content of an EIA document, process requirements, and the role of 
the public. The level of generality of our survey does not allow for a more fine-
grained analysis of how widespread such sub-norms are within jurisdictions 
across the world. However, the fact that the EIA norm manifests in a variety of 
forms and with different sub-duties in national regulatory systems and 
applications does not fundamentally undermine the assertion that there is a 
general principle that underlies the norm. In fact, it is precisely what one might 
expect of the implementation of a general principle within specific contexts. At 
its core, the EIA principle is an umbrella norm requiring the assessment of 
activities or projects that are likely to have a significant impact on the 
environment. If one desired to reduce the principle to even greater simplicity, 
one might describe its core as the duty to investigate and consider environmental 
effects before acting.175 
In the end, articulation of the EIA norm appears to be as similar in 
generality or specificity as other well-established General Principles of Law, 
such as the principle of res judicata establishing that final judgments are 
conclusive dispositions of legal disputes and the duty of reparation, which 
requires that “breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make 
reparation.”176 The EIA norm is general, yet arguably sufficiently specific and 
constrained to provide guidance on specific issues. 
2. Recognition as Law 
The second criterion of the General Principles provision requires 
recognition of the relevant norm as law. The survey results show that at least 
183 countries out of 197, or about ninety-three percent of countries, impose an 
EIA duty by legislation or regulation and another eight multilateral development 
banks and national development aid agencies require it as part of their 
operational processes, including lending practices. Only six jurisdictions clearly 
have not incorporated the EIA norm into their environmental governance 
systems, while we were unable to determine the status of eight other 
jurisdictions. Acceptance and incorporation of the EIA duty into the legislation 
 
 175. For additional discussion of the nature of general principles and the purposes that they serve, see 
ROBERT KOLB, GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4–13 (2017). I leave a more detailed discussion of the 
specific contours and limits of the principles to another time. 
 176. CHENG, supra note 123, at 233 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Factory at Chorzow (Ger. 
v. Pol.), Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, ¶ 29 (Sept. 13)). For examples of the level of generality with 
which other general principles have been described, see 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 
346–47 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955) (stating that the “maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas”—use 
your own property so as not to injure the property of another—is one of those general principles of law applicable 
under Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712 reporter’s note 2 (AM. LAW. INST. 1987) (describing the 
“standard of compensation” requirement); Am. Int'l Grp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 
96, 105, 109 (1987) (holding as “a general principle of public international law” that foreign nationals are entitled 
to “the value of the property taken,” and referred to the need to determine “the going concern or fair market 
value” of the property). 
70.2-YANG (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2019  12:36 PM 
February 2019]         ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT DUTY 561 
and/or regulation of the overwhelming number of states provides a clear 
indication that the duty is recognized as law within them.177  
The survey results, however, are unable to address a deeper question– how 
committed are each of the national legal systems to the EIA duty? In other 
words, is the norm not only mandatory by legislation but also enforced in 
practice?178 The issue is a real one, especially in the developing world and in 
nations with a weak rule of law. While most jurisdictions provide administrative 
agencies with some latitude in implementation, and hence discretion in regards 
to application of the EIA norm, in some systems, the gap between the law as 
articulated in legislative enactments (“law on the books”) and the law as applied 
(“law in action”) can be considerable. A government practice of enacting 
legislation that is routinely flouted or not enforced raises the questions of 
whether such legislation is really law at all.179 
The survey has not attempted to identify systems that systematically fail to 
implement EIA requirements.180 The situation is most likely to arise in the least 
 
 177. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (AM. LAW. INST. 
1987) (recognizing as law is implied in its phrase that the General Principle be “common to the major legal 
systems of the world”). 
 178. Within the law-recognition framework of H. L. A. Hart, this is a non-issue. Lack of enforcement does 
not in itself equate with non-recognition of a valid legal norm. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97–107 
(3d ed. 2012). In fact, no legal system enforces its legal norms one hundred percent of the time, including for 
reasons as simple as lack of resources and time constraints. A different issue would be presented with respect to 
the non-enforcement of an un-repealed, but invalid legislative enactment, such as laws against inter-racial 
marriage or alien land laws which have remained on the books in some states far beyond the determination by 
the U.S. Supreme Court that they are unconstitutional. 
 179. In fact, Judge Tanaka in his dissent to the International Court of Justice’s decision in Liberia v. S. Africa 
suggested that diplomats and other government officials have a role to play in efforts to identify valid legal 
norms:  
  The manifestation of the recognition of [a] principle does not need to be limited to the act of 
legislation as indicated above; it may include the attitude of delegations of member States in cases 
of participation in resolutions, declarations, etc., . . . [with respect to a norm] adopted by the organs 
of the League of Nations, the United Nations and other organizations.  
South West Africa Cases (Liber. v. S. Afr.), Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. Rep. 6, 250, 300 (July 18) (separate 
opinion of Tanaka, J., dissenting). Judge Tanaka’s view would imply that if the governmental branch 
charged with implementing a legal norm does not view it as sufficiently important or as legally obligatory 
for it to act on, then the norm might not really be “recognized” for purposes of Article 38(1)(c). A related 
issue arises with respect to judicial decisions, that is, judge-made law. While common law jurisdictions 
provide that judicial decisions can create new law, civil law systems disavow such power for the courts. 
Of course, the practical reality of judicial decision-making is rarely so simple, and the boundary between 
law making and law clarification is far easier to identify in theory than in practice. However, even if judicial 
opinions are limited in their substantive role to a law application function, they may nevertheless serve to 
clarify or confirm the governing legal norms. In that role, judicial decisions may assist, as evidence, in the 
identification of the applicable norms, even if they are themselves not authoritative. 
 180. Our survey did not come across any jurisdiction where the expert and scholarly commentary explicitly 
indicated that the EIA duty was entirely ignored. In our research, the closest was Sudan, where the UNEP 
indicated that the “basic EIA and approval process, [] is not applied effectively to the majority of projects, and 
not applied at all to upstream oil projects.” U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, SUDAN POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTAL 
ASSESSMENT 155 (2007), https://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_Sudan.pdf. However, anything short 
of the EIA duty being systematically ignored, as opposed to ineffectively implemented, would have required us 
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developed nations. Hence, if a reader of the survey applies a more stringent 
standard for “recognition as law,” the survey results cannot provide the 
information to meet that standard.181  
3. Whose Recognition of the Principle Counts?  
Under Article 38(1)(c), recognition of the principle as law must come from 
civilized nations.182 Scholars suggest that the 1920 Committee of Jurists did not 
intend colonialist connotations with this terminology and considered all nations 
to qualify as such.183 Furthermore, international scholars as well as the 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States appear to be 
in agreement that this criterion does not require one-hundred-percent adherence 
of all nations worldwide.184 However, some have suggested that adherence by 
countries representative of all the six families of law, that is, the common law, 
civil law, socialist law, African law, Islamic law, and East Asian law traditions, 
is necessary.185 
The survey results show virtually universal legislative adoption of the EIA 
duty across nations. It is found in all six families of law, including widespread 
adoption among Arab states. Even in the legal systems of nations such as Iraq 
and Afghanistan, which have gone through tremendous internal upheaval and 
dislocation in recent times, and authoritarian countries, such as Cuba and North 
Korea, the EIA duty has been incorporated into the environmental governance 
system.  
What about requirements and legal norms evolving in international 
institutions, especially Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and other 
intergovernmental organizations? For example, in 1989, the World Bank began 
 
to make judgment-calls (guesses, really) for which we did not have any further research or other informational 
basis. Nevertheless, as indicated, this is an issue that could merit further exploration.  
 181. However, it should be noted that in many such nations, the World Bank is likely to be active, and hence 
its EIA requirements may apply to many significant projects. As noted above, World Bank EIA processes apply 
independently of any national requirements. See sources cited and text accompanying supra note 42. 
 182. ICJ Statute, supra note 3, art. 38(1)(c). 
 183. See, e.g., CHENG, supra note 123, at 25; CRAWFORD, supra note 135, at 34 n.88; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 reporter’s note 7 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). One way to 
explain “civilized nations” is a reference to “countries of the world which have achieved statehood and are 
admitted into the family of nations—those which have become a sovereign political unity and have passed 
beyond the stage of being a primitive people.” Jalet, supra note 152, at 1044 (footnote omitted). However, it 
seems fair to ask whether nations whose governmental systems are authoritarian, dictatorships, or otherwise 
possess only a very weak rule of law should qualify. With respect to the EIA norm, the issue is moot since even 
rogue states like North Korea have adopted the EIA norm. 
 184. See, e.g., H.C. GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE METHOD 
OF LEGAL STUDY & RESEARCH 65 (2d ed., Wiley & Sons Ltd. 1971) (1949); see also South West Africa Cases 
(Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. at 297; North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Fed. Republic Ger. v. Den.; Fed. 
Republic Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 219, 229 (Feb. 20) (separate opinion of Lachs, J., 
dissenting). But see Jalet, supra note 152, at 1044 n.20 (asserting that universal acceptance is required and citing 
Bin Cheng). 
 185. See, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 158, at 812 (identifying five major families); Bogdan, supra note 174, 
at 46.  
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applying EIA requirements to projects that it supported through its lending 
practices.186 Violations of the EIA operational directive and policy can be the 
subject of the Bank’s Inspection Panel investigations. These requirements apply 
to World Bank-financed projects even when such projects are located in 
countries that may not have their own EIA legislation. In other words, MDB EIA 
requirements extend the applicability of the EIA duty into states that do not have 
EIA requirements or may not enforce them properly. Our survey results indicate 
that at least five multilateral development banks and three national development 
aid agencies apply the EIA duty. 
The role of the MDBs in helping to create a global consensus about the 
EIA norm is intriguing. Such entities are not sovereigns themselves, and hence 
do not possess inherent law-making powers. Like administrative agencies, 
however, they are the creations of sovereign nations and are usually endowed 
with authority to pursue particular objectives. To the extent that such 
organizations recognize or adhere to particular legal norms, they might be seen 
as contributing to an international consensus on a particular legal principle. As 
a practical matter, these organizations also help to impose EIA requirements in 
places that may not have their own national EIA systems. 
The duty to conduct an environmental impact assessment before engaging 
in projects that are likely to have a significant impact on the environment has 
largely achieved near universality, even if its formal acknowledgment as a public 
international law norm in the academic literature and in the discourse of 
scholars, diplomats, and international organizations has yet to occur. Based on 
this survey, its widespread legislative adoption appears to satisfy the criteria of 
a “general principle of law recognized by civilized nations.”  
IV.  THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
A. APPLYING THE EIA NORM AS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE  
Assuming acceptance of the proposition that the EIA norm has become a 
“general principle of law recognized by civilized nations,” what are the practical 
implications? Full exploration of the issues would go beyond the scope of this 
Article, but there are noteworthy consequences in at least three contexts: (1) 
international adjudications, such as in the ICJ, (2) operational practices within 
international organizations such as the World Bank, and 3) national law, 
including in the United States.  
First, the effect of EIA as a general principle of law should become most 
apparent in international adjudicative processes—before the ICJ, in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), and in other arbitral tribunals and human rights 
bodies. In the ICJ, Article 38 explicitly makes General Principles of Law part of 
the sources of law that the ICJ can rely on. Because the ICJ’s Pulp Mills on the 
River Uruguay opinion already pronounced the EIA norm applied in the 
 
 186. See, e.g., CRAIK, supra note 24, at 109.  
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transboundary context to be part of customary international law, an EIA General 
Principle would extend the norm’s applicability beyond transboundary disputes 
to other issues such as the global commons and any other situations where public 
international law applies. For example, fishing or whaling activities on the high 
seas and waste disposal activities at Antarctic research stations would likely 
have significant impacts on marine and fragile polar environments, and would 
thus trigger the EIA duty.187 
In the WTO dispute settlement process, the availability of general 
principles as a gap-filler is implied by DSU Article 3.2, which has been 
construed to recognize the applicability of public international law generally.188 
Again, that should include the EIA General Principle. While EIA issues do not 
appear to have been raised in past WTO disputes, one could imagine a challenge 
to a state’s EIA processes based on the argument that EIA requirements impose 
cost and delay, thereby impeding trade and violating WTO obligations.189 
Though many environmental regulations can be justified under the WTO’s 
exceptions provisions, sections 20(b) and 20(c) of Article 20 of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,190 the EIA General Principle would bolster the 
permissibility of EIA requirements.  
In another important international tribunal, the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the practical effect would likely be more limited. 
Under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), the law 
 
 187. Accord Envtl. Def. Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (1993); Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan), 
Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. Rep. 226 (Mar. 31). 
 188. Article 3.2 states that “existing provisions of [the WTO agreements can be clarified] in accordance 
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.” Id. According to the WTO Appellate Body, 
the Article’s “direction reflects a measure of recognition that the General Agreement is not to be read in clinical 
isolation from public international law.” Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated 
and Conventional Gasoline, at 17, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R (adopted Apr. 29, 1996); see also Joost Pauwelyn, 
The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 535, 543 (2001). 
 189. Professor Pauwelyn has even posed a hypothetical situation where a WTO panel might be called on to 
decide whether a non-WTO rule has been violated as part of a nullification claim in a WTO dispute. Pauwelyn, 
supra note 188, at 559. 
 190. When the WTO was concluded in 1994, it incorporated its precursor, the 1947 General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in toto. Hence, the 1947 GATT remains in effect through the WTO, which includes 
exceptions in GATT Article 20 that exempt certain types of environmental measures from WTO requirements. 
The relevant Article 20 provisions are:  
  Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute 
a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed 
to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: . . .  
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
 . . .  
g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective 
in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.  
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX(b)–(g), Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 262.  
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applicable to adjudications by ITLOS includes General Principles of Law.191 
However, UNCLOS itself, through Article 206, imposes an independent treaty-
based EIA requirement.192 Nevertheless, even if the EIA General Principle is 
duplicative of Article 206, it could still provide gloss as to how Article 206 
should be applied in practice.193  
In other contexts, for example in transboundary water disputes, the EIA 
General Principle would bolster the existing transboundary EIA duty.194 If an 
investor were to challenge a country’s EIA requirements by framing the EIA 
duty as an expropriation, the international equivalent of a government “taking,” 
the EIA General Principle could help blunt such challenges by supporting the 
legitimacy of EIA requirements.195  
Second, the EIA General Principle could also affect the operational 
practices of international organizations. While there has been disagreement on 
whether international organizations are bound by treaties to which they are not 
party to, there has been little question that international organizations are bound 
by customary law and general principles.196 For international organizations that 
do not already have an internal EIA requirement, the EIA General Principle 
 
 191. Applicable law consists of the Law of the Sea Convention “and other rules of international law not 
incompatible with this Convention.” U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 293, opened for signature Dec. 
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994). 
 192. Id. art. 206 (“Assessment of potential effects of activities: When States have reasonable grounds for 
believing that planned activities under their jurisdiction or control may cause substantial pollution of or 
significant and harmful changes to the marine environment, they shall, as far as practicable, assess the potential 
effects of such activities on the marine environment and shall communicate reports of the results of such 
assessments in the manner provided in Article 205.”); see also In re S. China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), 
PCA Case No. 2013–19, Award, ¶¶ 987–91 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016); Responsibilities and Obligations of States 
Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, Case No. 17, Advisory Opinion of Feb. 
1, 2011, 2011 ITLOS Rep. 10, ¶¶ 141–50. 
 193. For example, concerns that Article 206 is vague by its terms could be addressed in part through the 
General Principles analysis here. See, e.g., Maki Tanaka, Lessons from the Protracted Mox Plant Dispute: A 
Proposed Protocol on Marine Environmental Impact Assessment to the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 337, 356 (2004). 
 194. In re Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pak. v. India), 31 R.I.A.A. 1, 450 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2013). 
Where international adjudicative processes do not explicitly reference General Principles as part of the 
applicable law, judges would ordinarily still rely on them as part of the set of relevant background principles. 
See, e.g., Pauwelyn, supra note 188, at 541 & n.44 (citing A.D. MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 466 (1961)). 
 195. In the past, expropriation claims have focused on substantive environmental requirements. However, 
it is not too difficult to imagine a challenge to EIA requirements as imposing a regulatory “taking” because of 
the delay and other procedural costs they may impose on foreign investors. 
 196. See Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 Mar. 1951 Between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 
1980 I.C.J. Rep. 73, ¶¶ 37–38 (Dec. 20) (“International organizations are subjects of international law and, as 
such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, under their 
constitutions or under international agreements to which they are parties.”). The term “general international law” 
is commonly used to refer to generally applicable rules of international law, both customary law and general 
principles, as contrasted to rules of specific applicability, usually embodied within international agreements. See, 
e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 101(d) cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 
1987) (“Unless otherwise indicated, ‘international law’ as used in this Restatement is law that applies to states 
and international (intergovernmental) organizations generally.”); Pauwelyn, supra note 188, at 536; see also 
Kristina Daugirdas, How and Why International Law Binds International Organizations, 57 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
325, 327, 331, 380 (2016). 
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would create a new set of operational duties. For the World Bank and other 
multilateral development banks that already require EIA processes in their 
lending practices, the EIA General Principle would provide a supplementary 
legal basis for such a requirement. By enhancing the legitimacy of EIA 
requirements, it could also help to discourage state borrowers that are 
unsympathetic to environmental concerns from resisting these requirements. 
Finally, the EIA General Principle would affect national legal systems. In 
the handful of states that do not already impose an EIA duty, a new legal norm 
could become applicable in regards to their involvement in international 
matters.197 In countries that have already adopted the EIA norm, such as the 
United States, the effect would likely be limited though could still be noticeable. 
For example, because NEPA has been construed judicially to apply only within 
U.S. territory,198 assessment of the environmental effects of major federal 
actions abroad are performed as a matter of executive branch discretion under 
Executive Order 12114.199 With an EIA General Principle, such impact 
assessments could become required as a matter of international law.200  
B. OTHER GENERAL PRINCIPLES BEYOND THE EIA DUTY  
There is a logical further question—are there other environmental norm 
candidates for General Principles? It is not readily apparent that other 
environmental norms are as long-standing and as widely accepted as the EIA 
duty.201 In fact, one could argue that the primary purpose of the EIA as 
enhancement of the decision-making process rather than imposing substantive 
outcome requirements has made it easier to accept by government regulators, 
than norms with a substantive content. In this sense, the very criticism of EIA 
for not having stronger substantive content could be the reason for its universal 
appeal and widespread success.  
Nevertheless, lack of universal acceptance should not itself be an 
insurmountable barrier to general principle status. After all, “recognition” 
requires only acceptance by the major legal systems of the world.202 Norms that 
might be good candidates for General Principles status could be public 
 
 197. In that sense, the EIA norm has already accomplished what most international environmental legal 
norms articulated in custom and treaty aspire to, that is to positively alter the legal norms at the national and sub-
national level, where most environmentally harmful action occurs and where legal norms usually must be 
operationalized in order to be effective. 
 198. But see Envtl. Def. Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (1993) (describing a notable exception involving 
activity in the Antarctic). 
 199. Exec. Order No. 12114, 44 Fed. Reg. 1957 (Jan. 4, 1979). The agency obligations created by E.O. 
12114 are judicially unenforceable by the terms of the Order, see section 3.1, and there appears to be no 
comprehensive documentation of how consistent agency implementation of the Order’s requirements has been. 
 200. That could include EIAs for U.S. activities in the Antarctic, the high seas, see Greenpeace USA v. 
Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990), and on military bases abroad, see NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin, 
837 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1993). 
 201. Thus, it is quite possible that past difficulties encountered by scholars and judges in utilizing a 
comparative law research may still be encountered. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 153, at 67–71. 
 202. See discussion supra Subpart III.C.3. 
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participation and transparency norms, as embodied for example in the Aarhus 
Convention. Both are also primarily process norms. Another potential candidate, 
based on widespread support in national legal systems, might be the human right 
to a clean environment. Recent studies suggest that this norm has gained broad 
acceptance.203  
C. SOME FINAL OBSERVATIONS  
A few final thoughts with regards to the Article’s survey implications for 
the ongoing development of international environmental law remain.  
First, the survey findings provide an important reference point for 
evaluating the ubiquity of environmental legal norms across the world’s legal 
systems. The breadth of the EIA norm’s global adoption demonstrates how 
desirable states consider it as a tool for addressing environmental problems.204 
It will be interesting to see whether other environmental norms can achieve 
similar universality. 
Second, the survey’s methodology presents a unique opportunity to link 
the rapid development of national environmental laws to the development of 
environmental legal norms in the international system. As environmental law 
norms in many national environmental governance systems are far ahead of the 
international system, such linkage could potentially help advance lagging 
international norms and the broad consensus about the importance of a clean 
environment to human health and the quality of life. 
Third, utilizing the Article’s methodological approach promises to partially 
up-end the traditional “top-down” lawmaking and implementation structure of 
international environmental governance. In international environmental law, 
supra-national processes have been overwhelmingly responsible for creating 
new environmental law norms. Only after such norms have become embodied 
in treaties or customary law are they then passed down to the national and 
subnational government level for adoption and implementation. In contrast, 
international law norms associated with General Principles of Law emerge first 
in national legal systems and then, through their widespread acceptance in the 
major legal systems of the world, rise to the supra-national level as General 
Principles. One consequence of inversion of the law-creation process is to 
narrow the gap between the creation and the implementation of international 
legal norms since both occur at the national level first.  
 
 203. See DAVID R. BOYD, THE ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS REVOLUTION: A GLOBAL STUDY OF 
CONSTITUTIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2012). 
 204. One might even go as far as to suggest that regulatory norms adopted by a state for itself and its citizens 
are less likely to be influenced by self-interest concerns, posturing, other negotiation tactics that arise when states 
bargain with each other in making treaties and that can adversely affect the treaty commitments and norms 
adopted as a result. National norms and how they are formulated might ultimately be more honest and genuine 
expressions of what states believe to be necessary for effective regulation and the extent such norms should be 
legally binding. 
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Fourth, comparative law exploration of environmental norms can provide 
a better understanding of the nature of one recurring puzzle in international 
environmental law: the sense that there are or should be more binding norms 
with respect to the environment than are currently recognized by the 
international community. That sense manifests itself in “soft” international 
environmental law, norms that are deemed to be “not yet or not only law.”205 
Scholars such as Pierre-Marie Dupuy have explained “soft” law as a precursor 
or intermediate stage in the march toward “hard” law status, arising out of a 
long-term process of repetition of the non-binding norm in various international 
instruments.206 Professor Bodansky has explored and framed this process of law 
creation as a form of “declarative law.”207 The late Professor Jonathan Charney 
explained it as a form of “universal international law.”208  
Our survey suggests a further gloss on the nature of “soft” law: as the 
manifestation of the long-term process by which legal norms at the national level 
rise into the international domain. It may be the initial indication of the sense of 
international lawyers, diplomats and scholars that the relevant environmental 
norm constitutes a principle of law applicable not only in national law but also 
in the international system.209 Soft law may thus be the bridge in the 
development of national and international environmental law. Just as 
“everything is connected to everything else” in the physical, natural world, so 
are the legal norms governing it. 
Finally, technological developments, especially the Internet, have 
drastically changed the prospects of canvassing jurisdictions throughout the 
world in order to better understand the development of legal norms. Of course, 
the task remains time-consuming. However, with a more nuanced understanding 
of the origins and future of international environmental law as a reward and the 
chance to avoid “re-inventing the wheel” with governance solutions that may 
already exist in national systems, the effort should be worthwhile.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article’s survey demonstrates that the EIA norm has now become 
almost universally adopted by jurisdictions across the world. The findings 
support the widespread sense that EIA processes are a good practice in 
 
 205. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 157, at 350. 
 206. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 420 
(1991). 
 207. Bodansky, supra note 161, at 116. 
 208. Charney, supra note 143. 
 209. In fact, Professor Wolfrum as much as implied this in saying that:  
[General] principles are transported to the international level by finding acceptance in the 
jurisprudence of international courts or tribunals or by being referred to in resolutions of 
international organizations or policy statements of international conferences, such as world 
summits, for example. This equally establishes them as independent principles and as a source of 
international law. 
 Wolfrum, supra note 135, ¶ 55. 
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environmental planning and governance. The findings also mark the emergence 
of an environmental norm that is almost universally subscribed to by 
jurisdictions across the world. And finally, the survey findings suggest that the 
EIA norm has also become a general principle of law, a part of public 
international environmental law. 
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APPENDIX 1 












Africa 50 3 1 54 
Asia Pacific Group 54 2 – 56 
Eastern European 
Group 
23 – – 23 
Latin American & 
Caribbean Group 
28 1 4 33 
Western European 




Total 183a 6b 8c 197 
Multilateral 
Development Banks  
& Foreign Aid 
Agencies 
8 – – 8 
 
 
 a. Includes the European Union as a separate jurisdiction. 
 b. South Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Suriname, Singapore, and Nauru. 
 c. Central African Republic, Holy See, San Marino, Monaco, St. Vincent and Grenadines, St. Lucia, St. 
Kitts and Nevis, and Barbados. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Sources (organizations, articles, and websites) Most Heavily Relied on for 
Secondary Confirmation of EIA Norm 
 
1. ECOLEX, https://www.ecolex.org/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2019); FAOLEX, 
http://www.fao.org/faolex/en/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).  
2. NETHERLANDS COMM’N FOR ENVTL. ASSESSMENT, 
http://www.eia.nl/en/countries (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).  
3. United Nations Environment Programme, Environmental Assessment in the 
WIO Region: An Overview of the Policy, Legal, Regulatory and 
Institutional Frameworks Related to Environmental Impact Assessment in 
the WIO Region (2010) (unpublished report, on file with author). 
4. DEV. BANK OF S. AFRICA, S. AFRICAN INST. FOR ENV’T ASSESSMENT, 
HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT LEGISLATION IN THE SADC 
REGION (2007), http://www.commissionoceanindien.org/fileadmin/ 
resources/RECOMAP%20Manuals/Handbook%20on%20Environmental%
20Assessment%20Legislation_SADC%20Region_Nov%202007.pdf. 
5. DEV. BANK OF S. AFRICA, SADC ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION 
HANDBOOK 2012 (2012), https://irp-
cdn.multiscreensite.com/2eb50196/files/uploaded/SADC%20Handbook.pd
f. 
6. CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, National Reports and NBSAPs, 
https://www.cbd.int/reports/search/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).  
7. Dieudonné Bitondo et al., Evolution of Environmental Impact Assessment 
Systems in Central Africa: The role of National Professional Associations, 
SECRETARIAT FOR THE ENVTL. ASSESSMENT IN CENT. AFRICA (2014), 
http://api.commissiemer.nl/docs/mer/diversen/os_evolution_eia_centralafri
ca_2014.pdf. 
8. E-LAW, EIA Law Matrix, https://www.elaw.org/elm (last visited Jan. 19, 
2019).  
9. Ernesto Sanchez‐Triana & Santiago Enriquez, A Comparative Analysis of 
Environmental Impact Analysis Systems in Latin America (Apr. 6, 2007) 
(draft paper for the Annual Conference of the International Association for 
Impact Assessment), https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/ 
c688c7004c08ac00ae87be79803d5464/2_EIA+in+LAC+IAIA+Seoul.pdf?
MOD=AJPERES. 
10. AECEN, https://www.aecen.org/eia (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). 
11. WORLD BANK GROUP, LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT IN LATIN AMERICA, http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/ 
1069ce004c08ad23ae9cbe79803d5464/3_eia+in+lac+poster.pdf?mod=ajp
eres (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). 
12. Gunnar Baldwin, Approaches to Environmental Licensing and Compliance 
in Caribbean Countries (2016), 
https://publications.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/8083/Approaches-to-
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Environmental-Licensing-and-Compliance-in-Caribbean-
Countries.pdf?sequence=1. 
13. SECRETARIAT OF THE PAC. REG’L ENV’T PROGRAMME, Pacific 
Environment Information Network of Secretariat of the Pacific Regional 
Environment Programme, https://www.sprep.org/pacific-environment-
information-network-pein (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). 
14. INSTITUTE FOR GLOB. ENVTL. STRATEGIES, STRENGTHENING EIA IN ASIA 
(2016), https://www.aecen.org/sites/default/files/strengthening_eia_in_ 
asia.pdf. 
15. ENV’T & SOC. DEV. UNIT OF THE E. ASIA & PAC. REGION OF THE WORLD 
BANK, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT REGULATIONS AND 
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT REQUIREMENTS: PRACTICES 
AND LESSONS LEARNED IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA (2006), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/949001468167952773/pdf/408
730PAPER0EI1onal1review01PUBLIC1.pdf. 
16. U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR EUROPE, Environmental Policy: Reviewed 
Countries, https://www.unece.org/environmental-policy/environmental-
performance-reviews/reviewed-countries.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). 
17. ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., Find an Environmental 
Country Review, http://www.oecd.org/environment/ 
country-reviews/find-a-review.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). 
18. ENVTL. L. ALL. WORLDWIDE, Caribbean Environmental Law, 
https://www.caribbeanenvirolaw.org/countrieslistings (last visited Jan. 19, 
2019). 
19. Marcelo Acerbi et al., Environmental Impact Assessment Systems in Latin 




20. EUROPEAN COMM’N: ENV’T, Country Reports and Common Challenges, 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eir/country-reports/index2_en.htm (last 
visited Jan. 14, 2019). 
21. U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR EUROPE, Review of Implementation (National 
Reporting, https://www.unece.org/env/eia/implementation/review_ 
implementation.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). 
22. Ana Luisa Gomes Lima et al., Environmental Impact Assessment in South 
Asia, IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR SOC. & ECON. DEV. (2015): 
http://conferences.iaia.org/2015/Final-Papers/Sanchez-Triana,% 
20Ernesto%20-%20Environmental%20Impact%20Assessment% 
20Systems%20in%20South%20Asia.pdf. 
 
